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Abstract
Wireless networks are susceptible to network attacks due to their inherent vulnerabilities.
The radio signal used in wireless transmission can arbitrarily propagate through walls and
windows; thus a wireless network perimeter is not exactly known. This leads them to be
more vulnerable to attacks such as eavesdropping, message interception and modifications
compared to wired-line networks. Security services have been used as countermeasures to
prevent such attacks, but they are used at the expense of resources that are scarce especially,
where wireless devices have a very limited power budget. Hence, there is a need to provide
security services that are energy efficient.
In this dissertation, we propose an energy efficient security framework. The framework
aims at providing security services that take into account energy consumption. We suggest
three approaches to reduce the energy consumption of security protocols: replacement of
standard security protocol primitives that consume high energy while maintaining the same
security level, modification of standard security protocols appropriately, and a totally new
design of security protocol where energy efficiency is the main focus. From our observation
and study, we hypothesize that a higher level of energy savings is achievable if security
services are provided in an adjustable manner. We propose an example tunable security or
TuneSec system, which allows a reasonably fine-grained security tuning to provide security
services at the wireless link level in an adjustable manner.
We apply the framework to several standard security protocols in wireless local area
iv
networks and also evaluate their energy consumption performance. The first and second
methods show improvements of up to 70% and 57% in energy consumption compared to
plain standard security protocols, respectively. The standard protocols can only offer fixed-
level security services, and the methods applied do not change the security level. The third
method shows further improvement compared to fixed-level security by reducing (about 6%
to 40%) the energy consumed. This amount of energy saving can be varied depending on
the configuration and security requirements.
Keywords: Network Security, Wireless Networks, Energy Efficiency, Security Strength,
Tunable Security.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades many wireless networking projects have been started as initiatives
towards a network of a future world without wires. Wireless networks have been rapidly
adopted and widely deployed around the world. The most successful wireless network is
the cellular phone network which started as a very low speed link with minimum features.
Nowadays, it can provide up to 2 Mbps, and it has become the largest and most rapidly grown
network with millions of subscribers. Currently, wireless networks have expanded to include
a variety of devices such as laptops, personal digital assistants (PDAs), pagers, sensors and
wearable computers. Wireless networks are rapidly expanding due to their ability to provide
communications with ubiquity and mobility. Without wires, users with wireless devices can
move freely and are able to access wireless services anywhere any time. More and more
people now rely on small wireless devices to fulfill their tasks. Hence, both the devices and
the underlying communications need to be robust to provide reliable services and need to be
secure to protect the information they carry.
A. NETWORK SECURITY
Generally, network security is divided into four main categories: confidentiality, authenti-
cation, integrity, and non-repudiation [110]. Confidentiality services ensure that exchanged
information is accessible only to authorized parties by using encryption. It is used to protect
against eavesdropping from attackers who overhear transmissions over a wireless channel.
Authentication services verify the validity of identity of an intended party, and protect
against masquerading or identity spoofing which are attacks to gain unauthorized access to
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a network. Integrity services are used to confirm that the information has not been mod-
ified, duplicated, or re-ordered during a transfer. We can provide information integrity by
adding additional information, called keyed message digests or keyed hashes, that are cryp-
tographically related to the transferred information. The keyed message digests also provide
message authentication, where a receiver is able to verify the authenticity of the message
origin or generator. The keyed message digest is sometimes called Message Authentication
Code (MAC). Non-repudiation services ensure that a receiver can verify the unique origin
of a message and its creator, or a sender can guarantee to any party that the message has
originated from himself, and it has not been modified during transmission. Non-repudiation
services are also a combination of message authentication and integrity services.
B. SECURITY IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
Security in wireless networks is of paramount importance. Due to the broadcast nature
of the wireless radio signals, wireless networks are implicitly vulnerable to several network
attacks. Anyone within the wireless transmission range of a device (including malicious users
or attackers) is able to passively listen to or eavesdrop on the signals and could potentially
access information from the signals. It is also possible to actively transmit signals that can
attack the network. Wireless networks are therefore extremely vulnerable to many kinds of
security threats and they essentially need strong countermeasures to overcome those threats.
In the past few years, wireless data networks have been exponentially growing. Many
business and information technology applications have relied on wireless data networks such
as IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). The threats to those networks
are also growing. Due to the discovery of vulnerabilities of WLANs in 2001, many business
and government sectors have temporarily ceased to adopt WLANs in their networks because
they increase threats to their businesses [40].
The new cybersecurity policy from the Department of Homeland security has identified
many threats to our national networks and many business and government units have been
actively aware of these threats. The threats in wireless networks have also been identified as
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major threats to our national information security [34]. Subsequently, the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) released a special publication as a guideline for wireless
security geared primarily towards wireless local/personal area networks [62].
Providing security is not an option for wireless operators. It is imperative to provide
security services to wireless networks. However, providing security for wireless devices is a
challenging research topic. Wireless devices have limited resources such as low-speed CPUs,
small-sized memory, and importantly limited battery power. Making efficient use of battery
power alone has been an interesting research topic [55, 71, 106]. Enabling the efficient use
of security services in battery-powered devices is even more interesting and challenging.
Security services rely on cryptographic and mathematical functions that are known to be
computationally intensive. To deliver security to such resource-limited, battery-powered
devices, there is a need for methodologies to efficiently utilize a “reasonable” amount of
resources to supply a “reasonable” amount of security.
C. THE MAJOR CHALLENGES
Much research has focused on energy-efficient communication protocols for wireless devices.
Several protocols have been designed at different layers in the communication protocol stack
to save energy. At the link layer, for example, an adaptive transmission control protocol
was designed to save energy as described in [121]. In the standard protocol, after sending
a data packet, an acknowledgment packet is sent by the receiver to confirm the packet
delivery. However, when wireless channel conditions are degraded during transmission, the
acknowledgment packet may not be received due to the loss of itself or the transmitted data
packet. The adaptive transmission control protocol stops sending data packets, but instead
sends short packets or probes to the receiver. Until an acknowledgment of the probe packet is
received, the sender keeps sending probes. Once an acknowledgment is received, the sender
resumes the normal transmission mode. The idea here is that short probes consume less
energy than longer data packets for transmission.
Another example is in high error rate environments where a sender may adjust its error
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correcting code rate depending on the channel conditions encountered. Using lower rate
error correcting codes in low error environments can reduce energy while maintaining channel
integrity. By using these methods, energy saving is possible because sending short packets
or adjusting the error correcting code reduces energy consumption. These are examples of
how a protocol can be adapted or adjusted to dynamic environments in wireless networks.
To our knowledge, there are no adaptive or adjustable security protocols or systems that
have been suggested for use in wireless networks. Some protocols may offer adjustability or
can be used adaptively [43, 63], but none has really been used for the purpose of performance
optimization and energy efficiency. This may be due to the fact that these security protocols
are implemented for wired-line network systems and thus they do not consider variable
network environments and limited resources as factors in their design. Some security systems
have also been proposed to offer security adjustability, but none has considered the energy
efficiency [21, 22, 90].
For example, let us consider Kerberos which is aimed at providing authentication and
key exchange services in wired-line distributed networked environments [80]. A client device
needs to exchange at least six messages to be authenticated, to get a ticket for access, and
to access an application server. Transmission of these message exchanges could consider-
ably deplete the battery power of devices and would also substantially consume the network
bandwidth. Therefore, security services provided in wired-line networks can no longer be
directly applied as-is to wireless networks due to the difference in network characteristics.
Security in wired-line networks also has several assumptions about the networks (such as:
the transmission line is assumed to be somewhat physically protected, or devices operat-
ing in wired-line networks have unlimited-power and are not resource-limited, etc.). These
assumptions cannot be applied to wireless networks and systems. The following are some
unique characteristics of wireless networks that are relevant to security protocol design.
First, wireless networks are known to be “open”, in which their physical perimeter is
unknown. A person trying to access a wireless network may not be inside an authorized
perimeter. Additionally, since there is, of course, no wire in wireless networks, anyone
including an attacker can easily deploy his own wireless network which can be malicious.
An example is the case where an attacker deploys a rogue access point outside a company
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building to lure company employees to his malicious network to steal valuable information.
This attack is known as the “parking lot” attack [25]. Thus, the assumption of trust of
any network access point no longer applies to the design of a security protocol for wireless
networks.
Second, bandwidth is a limited resource in wireless networks. In wired networks, band-
width can be expanded by deploying more communication lines. This is not the case in
wireless networks and so a wireless network protocol should use bandwidth efficiently. A
security protocol that sends too many messages over a wireless link would waste bandwidth
and consume unnecessary energy for message transmission.
Third, radio signals are randomly degraded due to environment dynamics. Transmission
via radio signals requires protocol synchronization that can deal with the randomly changing
environment. A simple security protocol synchronization may not be a solution due to
random loss of data. A complex synchronization may be too expensive for small limited
devices. Asynchronous transmission may be a suitable solution to security protocol design
for limited-resource networks.
Fourth, roaming is a unique service present primarily in wireless networks. Users with
wireless devices often roam from one access point to another access point, requiring mobility
management mechanisms such as location updates and session handoffs or re-associations.
Security service management is also required for such scenarios. Roaming can complicate the
process of security service provision, or can probably be too expensive for small devices since
the newly associated access point may or may not be as secure as the previously associated
one. Wireless devices may need to start over a security process to securely access the new
access point, hence, utilizing large amounts of energy.
Last, wireless devices are powered by a battery which is a very limited resource. From
Moore’s law, the number of transistors in a chip will be doubled approximately every 18
months [78]. It implicitly says that the power of computing will grow exponentially. However,
the capacity of batteries is growing linearly, and this introduces a “power gap” which is the
difference between the power required by computing and the battery capacity [67]. Thus,
battery power tends to be a very seriously limited resource for small wireless devices, and a
security protocol should utilize energy to the minimum extent possible. This aspect is the
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primary focus of this dissertation.
D. MOTIVATION
From the aforementioned characteristic differences compared to wired-line networks, wireless
networks need a security system or protocol that is properly designed to account for these
inevitable differences. While there are several issues related to wireless networks as described
above, the focus in this dissertation is to design adjustable security protocols that are energy
efficient. The main thesis of our work is to employ the concept that it is possible utilize a
“reasonable” amount of energy to provide a “reasonable” amount of security. We will focus
this work only on WLANs; however, this concept of adjustable security can be applied to
other wireless networks as well.
Providing a reasonable amount of energy using the adjustable security concept may be
possible due to the following hypotheses:
The first hypothesis is as follows. The importance of information exchanged in wireless
networks should be a factor in designing a security protocol. Instead of being fixed, the
security protocol should be adjustable in term of the degree of security for network packets.
For example, A wireless user may use a medium level of security for normal information
exchange on his laptop. Then, when he needs to exchange important information such as
for on-line banking, he may increase the security level of his wireless protocol. Then, after
the exchange, he may decrease the security level to save energy for his laptop. Therefore,
there should be a way to allow wireless users to adjust their level of security as needed.
The second hypothesis is that the degree of security should also be related to the wireless
technology. In WLANs, there are 3 main types of packets, Management, Control and Data
packets. Management packets are for network association, authentication, and discovery.
They may not require encryption since the content is not secret. However, they may need
message authentication for packet integrity. Control packets are for traffic and access control,
and require similar security services as Management packets. Data packets carry user’s data
and require encryption for privacy. In each packet type, there are several subtypes and
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each subtype may require different security levels. Therefore, a security protocol should be
adjustable to the wireless technology to provide optimal security services for energy efficiency.
The last but most important hypothesis for this dissertation is that all encryption al-
gorithms or ciphers may not be energy-efficient all the time as they are currently used in
wireless networks. There may be some ciphers that could provide the same security level,
but consume less energy under some circumstances. Therefore, adjustable performance of
energy consumption is possible by utilizing different ciphers for different services under dif-
ferent circumstances.
From these hypotheses, we propose a security framework that utilizes different security
algorithms with different properties to provide tunable security to limited, battery-powered
wireless devices in dynamic wireless environments so as to reduce the overall energy con-
sumption.
E. CONTRIBUTIONS
• Performed exhaustive measurements of time and energy consumption of cipher primitives
as a function of a variety of parameters such as packet size, key size, number of operational
rounds, size of secret etc. and developed mathematical models for energy consumption
• Developed a method to estimate the robustness of a cipher and extended it to include
security protocols so as to have quantitative measures for evaluating security strength
• Proposed three methods for saving energy in security protocols in general and applied
them to wireless local area networks
• Developed an example security protocol for WLANs at both session and packet levels
that saves energy up to 40% compared to standard security protocols
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F. THE OUTLINE OF THE THESIS
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II explains related material
that is used as background knowledge in our work. In Chapter III, we perform a detailed
study and propose a performance model of energy consumption of cryptographic functions
used to provide security services. In Chapter IV, we discuss the level of security strength
and propose a performance model of security strength. In Chapter V, we propose an energy
efficient security framework, and show the application of the framework to standard security
protocols to improve their energy efficiency. The application of the framework shows that we
can save energy by changing or modifying the standard protocols. In Chapter VI, we propose
a greenfield approach in which a new security protocol, called TuneSec (Tunable Security),
is designed and evaluated. The concluding remarks and our future work are presented in
Chapter VII.
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II. BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we present an overview of topics that are closely related to our work. First,
we explain cryptography in general and describe some cryptographic algorithms in detail.
Then we describe network security services such as encryption, message integrity and authen-
tication, and digital signatures. Finally, we explain standard security protocols for WLANs.
A. CRYPTOGRAPHY
Cryptography plays a very important role in providing network security services such as
securing information exchange, authenticating users and validating users’ identities in a
communications network. Generally, cryptography is categorized into two kinds, symmetric
and asymmetric cryptography or secret-key and public-key cryptography respectively [109].
1. Symmetric Key Cryptography
Symmetric key cryptography uses only one key to provide security services such as confiden-
tiality and authentication as described later. The key is often referred to as a secret key;
therefore, symmetric key cryptography is often called Secret Key Cryptography (SKC).
SKC is widely used for data encryption due to its fast operation and portability [102].
Although the cipher is widely used to provide encryption, it is also used to deliver authen-
tication or integrity services by modifying the usage of the cipher. The cipher could be one
of two kinds, a stream cipher or a block cipher.
A stream cipher encrypts each bit or byte of a message at a time. Its most important
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advantage is the speed and so it is commonly used for delay-sensitive applications or within a
device that has limited memory or computing resources. The stream cipher generally works
as follows. Using a key and an initial vector (IV), a stream of random numbers is generated
which is called the key stream. A different IV is required to produce a different key stream
with the same key. Then, each bit or byte of the key stream is XORed with each bit or byte
of the message which produces the ciphertext. Examples of stream ciphers are RC4 [95] and
SEAL [98].
A block cipher encrypts a message on a block-by-block basis. For each block of a message,
the bits in the block are typically diffused, permuted, and manipulated with a secret key
to produce a block of ciphertext. With the secret key, the block cipher produces a unique
ciphertext corresponding to a particular block of plaintext. This makes it easy to identify
part of the message that has a known ciphertext. To eliminate the problem of identifying
blocks by this uniqueness or to provide different security needs such as producing a key
stream similar to a stream cipher, a block cipher can operate in different modes such cipher
block chaining (CBC) mode or Counter mode [109].
There are many examples of block ciphers, but well-known ones are DES [12], RC5 [96],
IDEA [102], CAST [20], Blowfish [101], Rijndael [42], Serpent [23], and Twofish [103]. The
Rijndael cipher is now a new National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) stan-
dard called the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [14]. Some of these algorithms are
explained in following sections.
A drawback of SKC is that key distribution and key management are difficult. To use
SKC in a communication, two peers need a shared secret key to encrypt a message before
transmission and to decrypt the message after reception. The distribution of the shared
secret key to all associated peers is not a problem if the number of peers is small. However,
in a large communication network, key distribution and management is difficult. With N
peers in a communication network, N(N − 1)/2 pairs of secret keys need to be generated for
communication. Thus, SKC is not scalable.
a. RC4 RC4 [95] is a stream cipher designed by Ronald Rivest in 1987 and it is widely
used in many applications today and in wireless networks such as IEEE 802.11 Wired Equiv-
10
alent Privacy (WEP) protocol [13], Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD) system [82], and
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Before generating a key stream, a key expansion
and an initial permutation process are required for each encryption. Hence, they introduce
an overhead for each packet before encryption. These processes can be cached into memory
for efficiency but the algorithm still requires more memory storage and it increases complex-
ity. It should also be noted that computation with RC4 does not depend on the key size or
operational rounds (a repeated operation that is common among SKC block ciphers).
Due to its simplicity, RC4 is fast and efficient once the key stream is generated, and
it can be written using only a few lines of code. It requires only 256 bytes of RAM. It
is also very fast since it uses only 7 CPU clock cycles per byte of output on a Pentium
CPU architecture [104]. Hence, it was one of the best encryption schemes during the past
decade. However, Fluhrer and many researchers have discovered several vulnerabilities in
the RC4 algorithm [48] that make it unsafe for any key size although increasing the key size
commonly increases the security strength. However, the weakness of RC4 can be mitigated
from potential attacks if the first 256 bytes of a key stream are discarded [93].
b. AES AES [14] (previously called Rijndael) is a block cipher designed by Joan Daemen
and Vincent Rijmen that has a variable key length of 128, 192, or 256 bits to encrypt data
blocks of 128, 192, or 256 bits long [42]. Both block and key lengths are extensible to
multiples of 32 bits. AES encryption is fast and flexible, and it can be implemented on
various platforms especially in small devices and smart cards. Also, AES has been rigorously
reviewed for security loopholes for more than two years before it was standardized by NIST
in 2001. AES is considered to be very secure.
The security of the AES algorithm depends on the number of “Rijndael” rounds. The
more the number of rounds, the more the security strength. Each Rijndael round is composed
of four operations, Byte Substitution, Shift Rows, Mix Columns, and Add Round Key with
some exceptions for the last round. The last round does not include the Mix Columns
operation. Also before the first round, an Add Round Key is required and this could be
considered as an overhead for each encryption or for each data packet in communications.
Compared to the computational overhead with RC4, AES has a much smaller overhead. AES
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is also known to be easily expandable. Its security strength can be increased by increasing
the number of Rijndael rounds.
c. Blowfish Blowfish [101] was created by Bruce Schneier as another cipher for 32-bit
microprocessors that is fast, simple, and has variable key length. It is composed of a key
expansion process and a data encryption process. Its key expansion process is very computa-
tionally intensive because it converts a key (up to 448 bits) into several subkeys totaling 4168
bytes. This can be a considerable overhead. Hence, Blowfish is only suitable for applications
without frequent key changes such as a file encryptor, and not suitable for data packets in
packet switching communications [102].
d. RC5 RC5 [96] was also created by Ronald Rivest. Like RC4, the RC5 algorithm
includes a key expansion process, and this is considered as an overhead for each packet
encryption. Unlike RC4, it is a block cipher and it is much more flexible in that it works
with variable parameters such as the input block size, the number of operational rounds,
and the key size to offer a great deal of flexibility for different applications. The security
strength of RC5 depends on the combination of block size and the number of operational
rounds.
2. Asymmetric Key Cryptography
Asymmetric key cryptography was first introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. It was
invented to solve the scalability problem of SKC in distributed networks. Asymmetric key
cryptography uses two different keys with two different methods for encryption and decryp-
tion. One key needs to be known only to its owner (called a private key) and the other
is not secret and can be distributed to other parties (called a public key). The public key
is typically used to encrypt a message and the private key is typically used to decrypt the
message. Asymmetric key cryptography is also known as Public Key Cryptography (PKC)
because one of the keys can be made public.
The PKC system is commonly used for distributed computer networks. For one party
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to communicate with N other parties in a network, it needs to know only the N public keys
of the other parties and its own (private key, public key) pair. The number of keys in PKC
does not exponentially increase as the number of communicating parties increases, and this
solves the scalability problem in large distributed communication networks.
PKC is also important for certain network security services such as non-repudiation which
is provided by using a technique called digital signature. An owner of a message signs the
message with his digital signature, and the signature is used for verification of the message
authenticity and also integrity. With the digital signature, the owner cannot deny having
created or transmitted the digitally-signed message with his signature. The non-repudiation
service and the digital signature are commonly used in email and e-commerce transactions.
However, PKC is not as efficient as SKC in wireless networks in two ways. Because PKC
algorithms are based on mathematically hard problems, the key size has to be much larger
than that of SKC to provide the same security levels as SKC [69]. More importantly, the
encryption schemes are known to be computationally intensive [75]. Therefore, this makes
PKC undesirable for use in wireless networks where wireless devices have limited resources.
However, with a new type of PKC, based on elliptic curves, it may be possible to implement
security services based on PKC for wireless devices [36, 26].
A PKC algorithm makes use of a trapdoor one-way function. A one-way function is a
method used to produce a “digest” from a message and it is computationally impossible to
reverse the digest to get the corresponding message (as described later in the context of hash
functions). On the other hand, the trapdoor one-way function is a one-way function that
has the property that it is possible to reverse the function by simply using a secret trapdoor
(a key). Consider a public key y and a function f(y, x) that maps the plaintext x to a
ciphertext x′ = f(y, x). With the one-way property, it is hard to find x from x′. However,
by using a private key or a secret trapdoor, z, it is possible to reverse x′ to find x such that
x = f(z, x′).
A mathematical example of the trapdoor one-way function is integer factorization. Given
a product of two very large primes (21024-digit primes), it is hard to find each prime from the
product. However, if either one of the primes is known, it is easy to find the other prime.
Either of the prime numbers is then the trapdoor. Some other examples of trapdoor one-way
13
functions are the knapsack problem, the discrete logarithm, and the lattice finding problem
[75]. In this work, we consider only popular PKC algorithms namely RSA [97] which is based
on the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problem and Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) [74] which is based on the discrete logarithm problem on an elliptic curve.
a. RSA The PKC algorithm that is widely used to provide security services today is the
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman code or just RSA [97]. In the example below Alice (A) wants to
send an encrypted message, to create a digital signature of the message, and to send both to
Bob (B). For this, she employs RSA. In RSA, first, a key pair needs to be generated. The
process begins with the selection of two large prime numbers p and q, and then calculating
their product n = p · q. Then, we choose an integer e between 3 and (n − 1) such that
GCD(e, p − 1) = GCD(e, q − 1) = 1 where GCD(x, y) is the greatest common divisor
of x and y. Then, we compute d which is the multiplicative inverse of e which satisfies
e · d = 1 mod φ(n) where φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the totient function. The public key is
(n, e) and the private key is (p, q, d). The security of RSA lies in the fact that given (n, e)
and any encrypted message using (n, e), it is computationally impossible to find (p, q, d),
that is necessary for decryption [75].
To encrypt a message m, Alice uses Bob’s public key kub = (nb, eb) to produce the
ciphertext c = meb mod nb. To decrypt the ciphertext, Bob will use his private key krb = db
to compute (c)db = (m
e
b)
d
b = m mod nb. The integer factorization of n into p and q is the
trapdoor one-way function (where calculating d which is necessary to reverse c to m is easy
if p and q are known). Thus, (p, q, d) is the trapdoor secret
In contrast to encryption, to sign a message m, Alice uses her private key da and her
public modulus na to encrypt a message to produce a signature sig = m
d
a mod na. Bob, the
message receiver, uses Alice’s public key (ea, na) to verify the signature as (sig)
e
a = (m
d
a)
e
a =
m mod na. The signature is valid if the message m (calculated from the signature) is the
same as the one received from the sender.
A detailed explanation of RSA encryption and decryption as well as signature genera-
tion and verification algorithms can be found in [110]. Note that usually RSA encryption
and signature verification are not as computationally intensive as decryption and signature
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generation. This is because the exponentiation of m to the public integer e for encryption or
signature verification can be made easy by choosing e to be a small number such as 3 [75].
On the contrary, RSA decryption or signature generation is much more computationally
intensive since the private key d is typically a very large integer.
b. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) The security of the ECC is based on a math-
ematically hard problem called the Elliptic Curve Discrete Log Problem (ECDLP) [74]. Given
P and Q = k · P where P and Q are discrete points (x, y) on an elliptic curve and k is a
random integer, it is computationally hard to find k given P and Q. The operation k · P is
called scalar multiplication which is a trapdoor one-way function, and k is a trapdoor secret.
To prevent a successful attack, k must be a large integer, and the number of discrete points
on the elliptic curve must also be large.
In ECC, private and public keys are generated as follows. The private key k is an integer
number randomly selected from [2, 2n] where n is the number of bits of the key k. The
public key R is a point on an elliptic curve where R = k · G and G is the base point
which is fixed for an elliptic curve. In this case, the asymmetry between the public and
private keys can be clearly observed. Even after making R and G public to any party, it is
extremely hard for someone who is not the owner to determine k. Several algorithms (such
as Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for digital signatures and Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) for key exchange) have been developed based on ECDLP [74].
The ECDH algorithm is commonly used to generate, for example, a pre-master key for a
session between Alice (A) and Bob (B). It is generated by “combining” a public key and a
private key of two peers. To generate the pre-master key, Alice uses her private key that she
combines with Bob’s public key, or Bob uses his private key combined with Alice’s public
key. The following explains how a pre-master key is generated for both Alice and Bob.
Given Bob’s public key RB, Alice uses her private key kA to generate ks = kARB = kAkBG.
On Bob’s side, given Alice’s public key RA, he uses his own private key kB to generate the
same pre-master key as ks = kBRA = kB(kAG) = kAkBG. Finally, both Alice and Bob have
the same shared key ks. Note that it is impossible for anyone else to generate the same
pre-master key when kA and kB are secret.
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The ECDSA signing and verification algorithms are somewhat similar to RSA in that
a party uses its private key to generate the signature of a message. The signature can be
verified using the party’s public key. A detailed explanation of the ECDH algorithm and the
ECDSA algorithm can be found in [122] and in [59] respectively.
B. NETWORK SECURITY (REVISITED)
Using techniques from SKC and PKC described in previous section, we can provide several
network security services. In this section, we discuss network security services in more detail.
1. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is a countermeasure to eavesdropping attacks. It utilizes encryption algo-
rithms such as RC4 or AES to manipulate or encrypt a message in such a way that anyone
who does not know the “secret” is computationally unable to reverse the manipulation to
recover the message. Note that the secret is typically called a key.
Figure II.1 shows the process of providing confidentiality. The scenario is that Alice
(sender) wants to send a message or plaintext to Bob (receiver) over an insecure channel. She
encrypts the plaintext using an encryption algorithm with a key kA to produce an encrypted
message or a ciphertext. Bob decrypts the ciphertext using a decryption algorithm with a
key kB to retrieve the plaintext. If the keys kA and kB are the same and the encryption
and decryption algorithms are the same, it is called symmetric key encryption or secret key
encryption, and the keys are called secret keys. If the key kA and kB are different, and so
are the algorithms for encryption and decryption, it is called asymmetric key encryption or
public key encryption. In the case of Alice sending Bob a message, the key kA is called Bob’s
public key and the key kB is called Bob’s private key. In the reverse case, Bob uses Alice’s
public key to encrypt and send a message to Alice, and she uses her private key to decrypt
it.
By employing symmetric encryption, two entities at both ends of a link need to share
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Figure II.1: An Encryption/Decryption Scheme
a key beforehand. Alternatively by employing public key cryptography, an entity (Bob)
may use a trusted third party (TTP) to distribute its public key. Any other entity (such as
Alice) that wants to send data to Bob obtains his key from the TTP beforehand and uses
his public key to encrypt data. Only Bob who owns the private key paired to the public key
can decrypt the data.
2. Entity Authentication
Entity authentication is also an important security service for wireless networks. Due to
the unknown coverage of wireless networks, an authorized area, such as a corporate build-
ing, limited by a physical perimeter can no longer be used to authorize users in wireless
networks. Radio signals can propagate outside the authorized area. Hence, without strong
authentication, a wireless network is vulnerable to unauthorized access which may lead to
other security problems.
A generic way that a peer authenticates itself is to provide to another peer its credentials
that only it can produce from a message and a secret key. A common scheme for entity
authentication is call a Challenge-Response scheme as shown in Figure II.2.
An authenticator (Bob) sends a message which is a challenge, C, to Alice who needs to
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Figure II.2: A Symmetric Key Challenge-Response Authentication Scheme
be authenticated. Alice replies with a response, R′, or the credentials associated with the
challenge to Bob. Bob verifies the response to his version of Response, R, which he generates
with his shared secret with Alice (k). Alice is authenticated if both R and R′ are the same.
This can only be the case if they are generated from the same key k and no one else can
produce R or R′ like Alice and Bob do. However, R′ and C can be recorded and reused by
any attacker. Therefore, the message R should be used only once to prevent so-called replay
attacks. The challenge should be unique to each entity, or it is vulnerable to impersonation
attacks. R is called a nonce, since it is a Number used only ONCE.
Different cryptographic functions, for example, SKC encryption (such as RC4 and AES)
or PKC encryption (such as RSA) can be used to create the credential which is required to
be uniquely associated with the key and the challenge.
3. Message Authentication
Transmission over wireless links is also susceptible to message modification or message in-
jection attacks. For instance, an attacker may capture packets during a bank withdrawing
transaction and modify them that the withdrawal goes to his bank account. Also an attacker
may inject malicious packets that look like they are from an authorized user to gain access
to the network. Message authentication is aimed at protecting such active attacks.
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Message authentication is similar to entity authentication in that it uses the credentials
produced from a message to prove the authenticity of the message. It shows not only that
the message is generated by an entity that claims to be the originator, but also that the
message has not been modified during transmission. The message modification or message
fabrication can be detected by verifying whether or not the credentials associated with the
message are valid.
The credentials of the message can be produced by using a one-way function. The
function f is a one-way function if it has a following property. Given a message m, it is easy
to compute f(m) = D. Given D, it is hard to find an m such that f(m) = D by any means.
D is called the credentials of the message m. This is because the authenticity of the message
m relies on the fact that if the message is modified to be m′, the corresponding credentials
will be D′ that is not the same as D. The functions that have the one-way property are
Hash functions and Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
The Hash function is a light-weight function that can be applied to a message m of any
size, and produces a fixed length output D called a message digest or a hash as shown in
Figure II.3 (a). There is no key for the Hash function, and that means anyone can produce
a pair of m and D. A hash provides only the detection of message modification. However,
applications often require the ability to prove who sent the message or to limit messages
only to some entities. In such cases, we need to use the MAC function.
m m
Message 
digest k
D D
Hash 
Function
H(.)
(a) (b)
H(.)E(.)
MAC
Figure II.3: (a) A Hash Function, (b) A Message Authentication Code (MAC) function
The MAC is different from a Hash function in that it uses a key or a secret k to produce
the message digest. Thus, only entities who possess the key can generate the message digest.
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The MAC is a compound function that is commonly composed of an encryption function
E(.) and a Hash function H(.). Figure II.3 (b) shows one example of how to use H(.) and
E(.) to create a MAC function. The MAC gives more security than the Hash function alone.
Without the key k, it is computationally impossible to produce a digest D from a message
m. The examples of Hash functions are Secure Hash (SHA) [81], Message Digest 5 (MD5)
[94], and RIPEMD-160 [75]. The examples of MAC functions are Hashed MAC (HMAC)
[66] and Cipher-Block-Chaining MAC (CBC-MAC) [28].
4. Digital Signature
Another kind of an attack is repudiation. A bank client may deny his/her transaction with
an on-line banker since there is no guarantee that the transaction was actually made by
the bank client. To protect against such an attack, a digital signature, which serves as a
written signature, for such an on-line transaction is introduced. The digital signature ensures
that only the concerned person can “sign” a transaction or a document. It is also used to
protect modifications to the transaction or the document. Unlike the written signature, the
digital signature is somewhat different in that it is message-dependent; it is unique to each
document or each message, and this provides message integrity as well.
Unlike the authentication scheme shown in Figure II.2 where SKC is used, the digital
signature is created by using asymmetric key cryptography or PKC techniques such RSA or
ECDSA. As shown in Figure II.4, Alice wants to send a message m to Bob. She uses her
private key krA to “sign” the message, and gets a digital signature D. Alice transmits m
and D to Bob. Bob then detaches the message m and uses Alice’s public key kuA to “verify”
the message which outputs D′. The message is valid if and only if the D′ is the same as D.
The digital signature provides two different security services for Alice and Bob. First,
Alice can use her digital signature to authenticate herself to Bob because no one else can
produce the signature without knowing krA (which is known only to Alice). In addition,
with the knowledge of only m, D, and kuA, it is computationally impossible to find krA.
Second, Bob also can use Alice’s digital signature as a guarantee that Alice is the one who
has signed the message m. This provides the non-repudiation service. Alice cannot deny the
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Figure II.4: A Digital Signature Scheme
fact that she did sign the message because no one else can forge her signature.
5. Key Agreement Protocol
In symmetric key encryption, the key used for encryption is assumed to be securely dis-
tributed beforehand. The key may be manually distributed via a secure channel. In wireless
networks with many peers, it would cause scalability problems. Therefore, key agreement
protocols are used to securely distribute a key in a scalable manner.
The key agreement protocol is usually performed after authentication to establish a
session key for security services such as encryption and message authentication. Many tech-
niques can be used in the key agreement protocol. Two examples of key agreement protocols
are described. In Figure II.5 (a), Alice and Bob want to establish a session key ks by using
an existing key k which is called a master key. Alice simply encrypts the session key ks and
sends Ek(ks) to Bob, and Bob decrypts it to get ks as Dk(Ek(ks)) = ks where Ek() and Dk()
are encryption and decryption functions with the master key k, respectively. The session key
ks is not known to any other person because it is encrypted during transmission. However,
this method is not scalable since the master key k still has to be distributed beforehand.
In Figure II.5 (b), another technique based on public key encryption is used to exchange
a session key ks. This technique uses two keys to generate the key ks, and it is called the
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Figure II.5: Key exchange protocol using (a) symmetric key, (b) asymmetric key algorithm
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol similar to ECDH.
Alice gives her public key kuA to Bob, and Bob also gives Alice his public key kuB. Alice
calculates the key ks from her private key krA and Bob’s public key kuB as ks = kuB ¯ krA.
However, Bob calculates ks = kuA ¯ krB. Here ¯ is a mathematical operation that is a
trapdoor one-way function. By using a function such as the discrete logarithm, both Alice
and Bob can produce the same ks. For example, if Alice’s public key is kuA = G
a mod n
where G is a common base integer and n is the modulus, it is computationally impossible
to find Alice’s private key krA = a given kuA, G, and n. Also Bob’s private key and public
key are krB = b and kuB = G
b mod n, respectively. The operation ¯ is simply modular
exponentiation in this case. Therefore, Alice calculates ks = ku
krA
B = (G
b)a = Gba mod n.
Bob calculates ks = ku
krB
A = (G
a)b = Gab mod n which is essentially the same as the ks Alice
calculates. A detailed mathematical explanation of the discrete logarithm problem can be
found in [110].
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C. STANDARD SECURITY PROTOCOLS FOR IEEE 802.11 WLANS
As shown in II.6, there are several standard security protocols such as TLS, IPsec, and WEP
for use with WLANs. Each of them (considered as an upper-layer protocol) is composed of
one or more security services as described in Section II.B. Each security service relies on
low-level components which are called security primitives such as ciphers, hash functions,
and trapdoor one-way functions as described in II.A.
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Figure II.6: An Overview of Standard Security Protocols
For example, confidentiality or encryption service is provided using a block or stream
cipher. Authentication and key exchange services may be composed using both block ciphers
and hash functions. One or more first-level protocols are combined to provide an upper
layer security protocol. For example, the TLS protocol uses encryption, hash function,
authentication & key exchange, and digital signatures to provide security services at the
transport layer [91].
Security protocols for WLANs of interest in this thesis include:
• Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) or IEEE 802.1x for providing authentication
& key exchange services, and
• Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) for providing data
encryption and authentication.
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1. IEEE 802.11 WLAN Architecture
Security services in WLANs can only prevent attacks on link level traffic between two entities
that are wirelessly connected. The entities are often referred to as mobile station or MS and
access point or AP. As shown in Figure II.7, one or more MSs are wirelessly connected to a
network via an AP in its a coverage area called Basic Service Set (BSS). The AP may connect
to a local area network (LAN) via a router to provide access to other network resources. In
one WLAN, there may be an extended service set (ESS) of more than one AP, which allows
MSs to roam across the ESS area. When a MS wants to access the network, it sends a request
to an authentication server (AS) via its associated AP. The AS then performs authentication
and may authorize the access request to the MS. During the authentication process, the AP
acts as a proxy to relay messages between the MS and AS.
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Figure II.7: A WLAN architecture
As an MS roams from its home network to a public access WLAN or hotspots as shown
in Figure II.8, it may have to participate in authentication processes that may be quite
different. The authentication process may be executed locally in the hotspot network to
access the Internet, or remotely in the MS home network. As the confidentiality service in
this scenario is only provided on the wireless link between the MS and the hotspot network,
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an upper-layer security protocol, such as IPsec, is needed to provide security services on the
link between a MS and its home network. Therefore, a security protocol for this scenario
needs to be carefully designed; otherwise, it is not efficient for use in small wireless devices.
We do not consider this problem in the thesis.
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Figure II.8: A WLAN architecture connected to the Internet
2. Data Encryption & Authentication Protocol
The first data encryption and authentication protocol used in WLANs was called Wired
Equivalent Privacy (WEP). It was originally created for use in IEEE WLANs or IEEE 802.11
link technology in 1999. However, the WEP protocol has been identified to have several
security flaws in the following years [32]. The Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance
(WECA) that later changed its name to Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) alliance, released a new
security protocol standard in 2002, called Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA), which aims to fix
the flaws [11]. A year later, another version of the WPA standard, WPA version 2 (WPA2),
was released to provide advanced security services. WPA is backwards compatible with
WEP; however, WPA2 is not backwards compatible with either WEP or WPA.
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The WPA and WPA2 are part of a new standard IEEE 802.11i that is an amendment
to the IEEE 802.11 standard to provide stronger encryption services and secure methods
of authentication [16]. The 802.11i standard provides two data encryption services called
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Counter Mode (CTR) Encryption with AES
cipher (CTR-AES), and two data authentication services called Michael and Cipher Block
Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC). The WPA standard is composed of the
use of TKIP and Michael together to provide data encryption & authentication services while
WPA2 is composed of CTR-AES and CBC-MAC. Together with CBC-MAC and CTR-AES,
it is called CCMP (Counter Mode CBC-MAC Protocol).
The WEP protocol utilizes RC4 [95] as the underlying cipher. WEP has several flaws
due its poor design and also the weakness of the RC4 algorithm [48]. There is a need
to replace WEP with a stronger protocol. However, many 802.11 network interfaces and
infrastructures are already deployed and it is expensive to migrate to a totally new standard
protocol. Therefore, TKIP and Michael offer intermediate security fixes while utilizing the
same hardware that resides in those network interfaces and infrastructures. TKIP offers a
software-based solution which adds a two-tier key mixing process that generates a random
key for the RC4 cipher to mitigate the IV-weakness attack in WEP [111]. Michael offers a
message authentication service which was not included in WEP. Due to the limited capacity
of WEP-based hardware, Michael needs to be lightweight. Therefore, Michael is composed
of only shift-and-rotate algorithms, and it is known to be a weak algorithm [46].
Due to the weakness of the RC4 cipher itself and the weak Michael algorithm, a new
standard, IEEE 802.11i, was proposed and ratified in 2004. It offers a new cipher, AES, which
is the new standard for data encryption proposed by NIST [14], as the underlying cipher
for CCMP protocol. Therefore, WPA2 employing CCMP protocol will not be backwards
compatible; however, it provides high-class security services. RC5 is another cipher that is
considered to be secure and efficient although it is not a standard cipher [61]. Due to its
flexibility features, we will consider both AES and RC5 instead of RC4 as underlying ciphers
in our work.
The WPA and WPA2 standards have two operation modes, Enterprise and Personal
modes. The Enterprise mode provides security services that fit an enterprise network which
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already has a network infrastructure including an authentication server. The Personal mode
favors users of small offices or home networks which has no authentication server. The
difference between these two modes is the protocol used for authentication and authorization
of network users. The Personal mode employs a password-based authentication, called Pre-
Shared Key (PSK), to authenticate users. In contrast, The Enterprise mode utilizes the
standard 802.1x protocol to provide a stronger authentication and key exchange protocol.
The 802.1x protocol will be discussed in the next section. Table II.1 summarizes the WLAN
security protocol standards.
Table II.1: WLAN Security Protocol Standards
Mode Service IEEE 802.11 WPA WPA2
Enterprise Authentication WEP IEEE 802.1x IEEE 802.1x
Encryption WEP TKIP/Michael AES-CCMP
Personal Authentication WEP PSK PSK
Encryption WEP TKIP/Michael AES-CCMP
3. Access Authentication & Key Exchange Protocol
a. EAP/IEEE 802.1x Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) or IEEE 802.1x is a
standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks (LAN/MAN) which is used to provide
port-based network access control [15]. The EAP itself is not an authentication protocol. It
provides an encapsulation for any entity authentication protocol such as the TLS Handshake
protocol [43] to perform actual authentication. The EAP was first used for point-to-point
network access with password-based authentication such as CHAP [107], and later proposed
for use with TLS for WLANs. Now EAP-TLS is part of the WPA, WPA2, and IEEE 802.11i
standards.
Within the EAP framework, three entities are involved in the user authentication process:
Supplicant, Authenticator, and Authentication Server. In a typical scenario, Supplicant is a
mobile station (MS) requesting network access, Authenticator is the MS’s access point (AP)
that is a bridge to the rest of the network, and Authentication Server (AS) is an Authentica-
tion, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server such as RADIUS (Remote Authentication
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Dial In User Server) [92]. For the authentication process, the current EAP standard man-
dates only asymmetric authentication such that it only requires a MS to authenticate an
AS (or server authentication) but not vice versa. It leaves the MS authentication (or client
authentication) to vendors who can specify their own method using their RADIUS server.
For example, the client authentication could be a traditional password-based authentication
that it is widely used for dial-up and authentication in hotspot networks.
The scheme of the EAP authentication protocol is based on a challenge-response scheme.
In this scheme, there are four types of messages: Request, Response, Success, and Failure.
A typical EAP message exchange is shown in Figure II.9. First, a supplicant initiates an
authentication process by sending an EAPOL-start message. Then a series of Request and
Response messages are exchanged. The number of the Request and Response pairs depends
on the underlying authentication scheme (such as TLS or passwords). The underlying au-
thentication protocol is enclosed in a box in Figure II.9. There are many authentication
schemes that are proposed to be used with EAP, but the mandatory one is EAP with TLS
or EAP-TLS [19].
Supplicant Authenticator Authentication
Server
EAP-Request/Id
EAP-Response/Id Radius-Access-Request
Radius-Access-Challenge
EAP-Request 1
EAP-Request N
EAP-Response 1
EAP-Response N
Radius-Access Response 1
Radius-Access AcceptEAP-Success/Failure
EAPOL Key (optional)
Radius-Access Response N
EAPOL-Start
Figure II.9: A typical EAP authentication protocol
EAP-TLS can provides mutual authentication, but the client authentication is indicated
as optional in the standard. Figure II.10 shows a typical EAP-TLS protocol with only the
server authentication between a MS and an AS server. After initiating the authentication
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by exchanging EAP Request/Response Id messages with an AP, a normal TLS handshake
protocol between the MS and the AS is started. After the authentication process, the key
generated during the Handshake protocol between the MS and the AS is forwarded to the
AP by the AS.
EAP Request/Id
EAP Response/Id
ClientHello
ServerHello, ServerCertificate,
ServerHelloDone
Change Spec, Finished (Encrypted)
ClientKeyExchange, ChangeSpec, 
Finished (Encrypted)
EAP Success
MS AP AS
EAP/ TLS Start
Radius Accept/ a Key
Radius-Access-Request
Radius-Access-Challenge
Figure II.10: An EAP-TLS with only server authentication
Client authentication is also possible using EAP-TLS. This process is usually optional
because it requires each client to have a valid public key certificate that will be used to
authenticate the client. It also requires a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to issue and revoke
the certificates that additional investment is needed. Instead, a traditional password-based
authentication protocol is often preferred to use with EAP Tunneled TLS (EAP-TTLS) to
avoid the expensive PKI deployment [50].
b. WPA-PSK WPA-PSK is the standard security protocol in Personal mode for home
or SOHO (Small Office Home Office) networks where there is no authentication server such
as RADIUS. The WPA-PSK provides user authentication and session key management.
The authentication is based on a shared secret or a paraphrase that is known between
an access point (AP) and a mobile station (MS) prior to authentication. Based on the
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ESS identity (ESSID) of the networks and the paraphrase, a pairwise master key (PMK)
is generated. From the PMK, nonces and MAC addresses of the AP and MS, a session
key is generated. The nonce is for preventing the replay attack. The session key has to be
renewed after a time interval to increase the security and prevent attacks on a fixed key. The
WPA-PSK authentication relies solely on the secret of the paraphrase to generate a session
key; thus, it may be subject to dictionary-based attacks as shown in [113].
4. IEEE 802.11 Authentication and Key Agreement
Generally, authentication and key agreement (AKA) occurs in one protocol. The authenti-
cation is performed between a mobile station (MS) and an authentication server (AS) via an
access point (AP). If the user has the right to access the network, a session key is generated
with an agreement between MS and AS. Figure II.11 shows the standard AKA protocol for
802.11 WLANs.
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ANonce, MIC, AP RSN IE
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Figure II.11: The 802.11i Standard Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol
In the figure, the AKA protocol can be divided into three phases. During the Service
& Security Discovery and Associate phase, the MS looks for an AP that provides capacities
and security services to which it is compatible. Then, the MS selects the capability and
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services. The capacities and services of an AP is described in a beacon packet which is
periodically broadcast. The MS then requests an association to the AP. The AP responds
to the request and initiates an authentication process in the second phase, which now occurs
between the MS and AS. In this phase, the AP acts as a proxy between the MS and AS. After
the authentication is successful, a session key called Pre-Master Key (PMK) is generated
and distributed from the AS to AP. The PMK is also generated by the MS without key
transportation from the AS or AP. This way the key is never revealed on the air.
In the third phase, the AP initiates a 4-way handshake. The purpose of the standard
4-way handshake is twofold. It is used between the MS and AP to confirm the possession of
the PMK and to derive a pairwise transient key (PTK) from the PMK for freshness. The
PTK is then used to derive three other keys: a key confirmation key, a key encryption key
and a temporal key for data encryption during a session. Additionally, the 4-way handshake
is used for agreement upon the cipher suite, and for transportation of an encrypted group
transient key from the AP to the MS for secure broadcasting.
When a MS wishes to disassociate from an AP, the MS may request deauthentication
to destroy the PTK, but the PMK may be cached. With the cached PMK, the MS can re-
associate to the same AP without authentication, and only the 4-way handshake is required
to generate a new PTK (see [16] Section 5.4.3.2). To reuse the PMK, the MS needs to
include a list of cached PMKs in a (Re)Association Request frame, and the AP may reply
with which PMK is selected in the first message of the 4-way Handshake (See [16] section
5.9.5). This requires both the MS and AP to cache PMKs and to provide for secure key
caching.
D. SECURITY ATTACKS IN WLANS
Wireless networks are inherently vulnerable to several security attacks due to the nature of
open medium in the networks. In this section, we give an overview of security attacks in
WLANs. The following attacks are also common to other types of wireless networks.
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1. Brute-Force Search Attack
The brute-force search attack is the attack trying to find a match of two messages by going
through every possible message. For example, for a message that is 64 bits long with an
equally long key, the attack requires 264 operations at most or 263 operations on average. The
attack is commonly used for key search; thus it is commonly called key search attack. From
a pair of known plaintext and a its corresponding ciphertext, the attack tries to find the key
using the brute-force search. The key is found if the encryption of the plaintext matches
the ciphertext. This attack is simple, and requires only the pair of plaintext-ciphertext. It
however requires more operations as the message or the key size increases.
2. The Dictionary-based Attack
The dictionary-based attack is similar to the brute-force attack. However, the searching
space is smaller. The attack is also called the password-guessing attack. Based on the
known words in a dictionary, the table of pairs of the known words (or plaintexts) and the
encryption of the words (or ciphertexts) is pre-computed. Then, an encrypted password is
captured and is brute-force searched through the table to find the match of the plaintext.
To prevent the dictionary-based attack, the paraphrase needs to be long and random. The
WEP and the WPA-PSK could be vulnerable to this attack since they utilize a password
or a paraphrase as a shared secret. The non-password-based EAP such as EAP-TLS is
not vulnerable to this type of attack. However, EAP-MD5 which is the password-based
authentication is vulnerable to this attack.
3. The Eavesdropping Attack
Due to the nature of the radio signal that can propagate through walls and ceilings, it is
possible for an outsider to eavesdrop traffic sent or received by a mobile station. To increase
the privacy of WLANs, encryption is required, which is provided by using a cipher with a
secret key. The WEP assumes that all mobile stations in the entire network share the same
key. Therefore, with WEP any mobile station, which can access the network, can eavesdrop
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on traffic and this is called the insider attack. The WPA and WPA2 are not vulnerable to
eavesdropping and insider attacks since each pair of communication utilizes a pairwise key.
4. The Replay Attack
The replay attack is where an attacker tries to access or claim to be legitimate to the network
or other parties without possessing the secret key. The attack relies on previously recorded
conversations of other legitimate parties and replaying the conversation. The attack can be
eliminated if a session key is freshly generated for each conversation and for each session. It
is common to use a nonce as a countermeasure with a shared key to generate a fresh session
key for each conversation. WEP is vulnerable to this attack as it uses a 24-bit IV with a
shared key as the RC4 key for encryption. Since the IV is short and can be repeated, it
is possible that the RC4 key is not freshly generated. WPA and WPA2 are not vulnerable
to replay attacks since each session key is generated from nonces which guarantee the key
freshness.
5. The Session Hijacking Attack
It is an attack that tries to steal a session from a legitimate user to access the network.
This attack happens after the authentication between users and the network, and the MS is
authorized or is allowed a session to access the network. Therefore, if a malicious user can
hijack the session, he can access the network without authentication.
The session hijacking attack often includes the packet injection attack and the imper-
sonation attack. The injection attack is to disassociate an associated user from the network
without detection by the network; hence, the session created by the legitimate user is still
available. This means a malicious user can impersonate the legitimate MS, which is already
disassociated from the injection attack, and is able to transmit or receive messages as a
legitimate user.
This attack can be prevented by using message authentication codes (MACs). WEP is
vulnerable to this attack since it does not utilize any MAC algorithm. code. WPA employs
Michael as the MAC algorithm, but it is known to be weak [46], which means the attack is
33
still possible although requiring some effort. WPA2 employs CBC-MAC with AES cipher,
and it is known to be strong and immune against this attack.
6. The Man-in-the-Middle Attack
It is an attack whose goal is to steal valuable information from a legitimate MS of the
network. The information can be the username and password, or a shared secret which may
later be used to access the same network. In this attack, an attacker sets up a device to be
a “man in the middle” between the legitimate MS and AP. The device acts as a (legitimate)
access point to the legitimate MS, and a (legitimate) user to the legitimate AP. The device
tries to convince the legitimate MS to associate with it to steal valuable information. The
convincing may require communication with the legitimate AP. This attack can be prevented
if a mutual authentication between MS and AP is employed.
WEP as well as WPA and WPA2 that use PSK are not vulnerable as long as the shared
secret or paraphrase is not compromised. WPA andWPA2 (that use IEEE 802.1x/EAP)may
be vulnerable to this attack. For example, EAP-TLS with mutual authentication is strong
against this attack. However, EAP-MD5 is subject to the dictionary-based attack since the
encapsulated protocol which is password-based authentication is already vulnerable to the
dictionary-based attack [31].
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III. MEASUREMENT AND MODELING OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION
OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
Security can be provided at different levels using different settings with different security
primitives, which can consume different levels of energy. The security settings can be different
in many factors, but the main factors are the choice of ciphers used to provide security
functions, the key length, and the number of operational rounds. These factors also have a
substantial impact on the energy consumption for providing security.
A security algorithm or a cipher is a function that is commonly used to provide security
services such as encryption and message authentication. Many ciphers have been created,
but only few are known to be strong and secure, which means no loophole or backdoor is
known. That a cipher is strong is practically hard to prove unless it has been rigorously
reviewed by cryptographers and experts for many years (such as in the case of AES). RC4
was known to be very efficient in term of computation, but has some loopholes [48]. RC5
and Blowfish are known to be strong. One may however expect these ciphers to consume
different levels of energy since the way they operate are different.
With a strong secret key cipher, the length is another factor to increase the strength of
encryption. A key size of 128 bits would able to resist an exhaustive key search or brute-
force attack until the year 2075 [69]. This belief is based on the argument that the strong
cipher has no known short-cut attacks, e.g. attacks that are more efficient than the brute
force attack. Using the brute force search with an 128-bit key requires 2127 searches on
average. This is considered to be infeasible with today’s technology. Thus, a large key size
would provide more strength against a brute force attack. On the contrary, a long key may
increase computation and hence energy consumption.
The strength of a cipher depends not only on the key size but also on the number of
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operational rounds (which normally is a routine of data diffusion and manipulation). The
number of rounds is an important factor that provides security strength against attacks such
as linear cryptanalysis [73] and differential cryptanalysis [29]. Unlike the brute-force attack
where 2k−1 trials (on average for a k bit key) are required to break the key, cryptanalytic
attacks can be more efficient. Depending on the algorithm, a high number of rounds may be
required for robustness against such attacks. A good security algorithm should not use too
few or too many operational rounds. Too few rounds would make the encryption vulnerable
to cryptanalysis attacks, and too many rounds would be unnecessary, and importantly can
consume more energy. Thus, to provide the same security strength, each algorithm may
require a different number of operational rounds.
For example, Rijndael needs at least 6 rounds for a 128-bit key, 8 rounds for a 192-bit
key, and 10 rounds for a 256-bit key to provide enough security strength against all known
attacks [41]. However, the proposed standard adds more rounds for providing a security
margin. Thus, AES performs 10 rounds for a 128-bit key, 12 rounds for a 192-bit key and
14 rounds for a 256-bit key [14]. RC5 is a block cipher with a variable key size, a variable
input size, and variable numbers of rounds of operations. There is a differential attack that
requires 253 chosen plaintext for 12 rounds and 268 for 15 rounds [61]. However, the input
of RC5 is only 64 bits long; therefore, such an attack is impossible with at least 16 rounds
since collectiong 253 chosen plaintexts is virtually impossible. The linear attack, which is
less powerful than the differential attack, is impossible after 6 rounds. The recommendation
from Rivest, the creator of RC5, is that RC5 should have at least 12 rounds to provide
enough security strength, or 16 rounds to provide complete security strength [96]. Blowfish
is another flexible block cipher with a variable key length and a customizable S-box (a non-
linear diffusion box). The key for Blowfish can be up to 448 bits. There is a differential
attack which requires 24r+1 chosen plaintexts where r is the number of rounds. Therefore,
with 16-round Blowfish, such an attack is completely ineffective because the input size in
the case of Blowfish is 64 bits long.
Clearly, different settings of algorithms, key sizes and rounds of a cipher will have different
amounts of energy consumption. In wireless communications, as we will see in this chapter,
the data packet size is also another factor that impacts the energy consumption. For instance,
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some security algorithms are more efficient only if they are used to encrypt longer packets. In
the next sections, we explore the performance of different security settings in terms of energy
consumption. We also propose performance models for energy consumption of the security
settings. Additionally, we also use different implementations of cryptographic functions to
confirm the difference in energy consumed. We consider three commonly used cryptographic
libraries, OpenSSL, Cryptlib, and Crypto++. We also use different methods for measuring
energy consumption to confirm the validity of the difference in energy consumed.
A. MEASUREMENT OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION
Energy consumption of security primitives can be measured in many ways. The obvious
mechanism is to directly measure the energy consumption of each component of a device
such as a laptop or a PDA. This method gives the actual value of energy consumption due
to each hardware component of the device. Components involved in operations of security
primitives would be the CPU and its memory unit. However, to measure only the energy
consumption of a security primitive, this method is probably too complex. This method
is used in the research work by Viredaz and Wallach to measure energy consumption in a
pocket personal computer device [115]. A less complex method is to measure the total energy
consumption of the device, which can be measured by measuring the input current drawn
by the device from its power supply.
A second method used to measure energy consumption is to assume that an average
amount of energy is consumed by normal operations and to test the extra energy consumed
by an encryption scheme [56]. This method simply monitors the level of the percentage
of remaining battery by using the standard API of Advanced Power Management (APM)
or Advanced Configuration and Power Interface (ACPI). This method has some limitations.
The extra energy consumed by one encryption can be very small compared to that by normal
operations especially for SKC algorithms. Thus, the granularity of power measurement is
very coarse; hence, the amount of measured energy consumption is unlikely to be precise.
However, the accuracy of this method could be improved by using an external multi-meter
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that can read the level of current drawn by one encryption.
The energy consumption of security primitives can also be measured by counting the
amount of computing cycles which are used in computations related to cryptographic oper-
ations. The number of cycles is usually used by cryptographers to evaluate new encryption
algorithms such as those which were proposed for the new Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) [105]. Each cycle of CPU spent for an instructional set consumes some amount of
energy. In [79], details of the numbers of cycles taken up by each instruction of Intel 486DX2
processor and also various amounts of current drawn from a battery are provided. By av-
eraging the amount of energy consumed in each cycle, we can convert the number of cycles
used by a security primitive into its amount of energy consumed. This technique is also used
in research work by Carmen et al. [38].
While the first method shows the real energy consumption and gives the overall energy
performance and the second method actually reads out the battery level in a mobile device,
in this work, we use the third method to determine the energy consumption of a security
algorithm. This provides us simplicity and fine-grained measurement. We also use the first
method for comparison with the third method in Section III.G.
1. Cycle Counting Energy Measurement
To convert cycles to energy consumption, we need to know approximately how much current
is drawn for one computation cycle, the operating voltage, and the operating speed of a
processor. For example, an Intel Mobile Pentium III processor has two working modes,
full power mode and low power mode. In the full power mode, the processor is normally
operating at 1.60 volts with a maximum current of 16.6 A at the speed of 800 MHz. In the
low power mode, it is running at 650 MHz, and operating at 1.35 volts with a maximum
current of 12.0 A [9]. From the above variables, the energy consumption (E) of each security
algorithm can be computed as E = (C × V × I)/F where C is the number of cycles, V is
the operating voltage, I is the average current for each cycle, and F is the CPU frequency
or speed.
However, we do not have a benchmark tool that can measure exactly how much current
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is drawn for each instruction or each cycle. Also, this approach assumes that the current is
constant over the cycle. We need to estimate this value. On average, each cycle consumes
approximately 270 mA on an Intel 486DX2 processor [79] or 180 mA on an Intel Strong
ARM chip [108]. Based on these, we assume that the average current drawn for our Mobile
Pentium M is close to 200 mA. This number is fixed for all energy consumption calculations,
and it could be changed easily for energy calculations if the true average current for the
processor is known. The key variable here is the number of cycles used for each security
algorithm.
For our experiments, we use a laptop with a mobile Pentium III 800 MHz CPU, in which
performance data are collected. We use the cryptographic software library from OpenSSL
version 0.9.7a [1] to implement security test programs in our work. While other libraries do
exist [114], we choose OpenSSL because it has been widely used in the research community
and in many open-source research projects. It has been rigorously reviewed by many cryp-
tographers and programming experts for its correctness and performance. We also use the
widely-used Cryptlib [2] and Crypto++ [3] libraries for performance comparison as described
later. All of the three crypto libraries are certified under the NIST FIPS-140-2 specifications.
B. ENERGY PERFORMANCE OF SECRET KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
Before transmission, a message is often divided into packets. Packets are encrypted individ-
ually to provide data confidentiality. Encryption of different packets should not be related
because a loss of one encrypted packet means a loss of all related encrypted packets. Es-
pecially in wireless networks where the packet loss rate is high, it is common to provide
a per-packet key to encrypt each packet independently so that the decryption can tolerate
packet losses.
Since each packet requires a per-packet key, before the packet encryption takes place,
there may be need to expand the single shared key. The key expansion process can be con-
sidered as an overhead for each packet encryption. Thus, the first parameter for encryption
that may affect the security performance is the packet size. While the packet size is often
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statistically distributed and it depends on what communication layer produces the packet, a
long packet would usually reduce the encryption overhead and thus improve the performance.
The second important parameter for the encryption is the size of the encryption key. A
large key size would provide more strength against a brute force attack as well as other types
of attacks. On the contrary, a long key may also increase computation and hence energy
consumption. The third factor that would affect the security performance is the number
of operational rounds. A larger number of rounds would prevent successful cryptanalytic
attacks, but would also require more computation and hence energy.
In this section, we describe the effect of these three parameters, data packet size, key size,
and the number of operational rounds, on the performance of different secret key encryption
algorithms in terms of energy consumption. These three parameters are chosen as they tend
to be significant factors of energy consumption for encryption.
1. Encryption with Different Packet Sizes
The packet size has been known to have significant effect on wireless transmission. Transmit-
ting large sized packets improves the network utilization because the ratio of the overhead
to data payload size is low. On the contrary, large size packets are more susceptible to errors
during transmission than smaller sized packets [70]. The packet size also affects the energy
consumption due to transmission [45].
The packet size also has an effect on energy consumption due to encryption. From the
need for per-packet keying, each packet may require a key expansion process which requires
a fixed amount of energy for computation and is independent of the packet size. Our study
has shown that encryption of long packets consumes less energy than that of short packets
using the same key length and operational rounds [88]. For example, with 128-bit key RC5
algorithm, the key expansion takes about 65 % of the total energy for encrypting a 16-byte
packet, and that can be decreased to 14 % if used for encrypting a 256-byte packet. Some
encryption algorithms need to expand the key that requires more subtle data diffusion and
manipulation such as the case of the Blowfish algorithm. The 128-bit key expansion process
in Blowfish takes about 98 % and 94 % of the total energy to encrypt a 16 byte long packet
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and a 256 byte long packet respectively. Hence, Blowfish is only appropriate for encrypting
a large file rather than individual packets.
After key expansion, a packet can be encrypted. In the case of a block cipher, the
packet that is larger than the input size of the cipher is divided into several blocks, and
then encrypted. The overhead in this process is the block division. However, block division
consumes very little energy since it can be done using instructions which take few CPU
cycles.
Figure III.1 shows the energy consumption of different encryption algorithms using 128-
bit keys with different packet sizes. It can be observed that AES encryption consumes far
less energy than others when encrypting smaller packets. The AES key expansion consumes
much less energy than others. Hence, the packet size only slightly affects the AES algorithm.
RC5 consumes more energy than AES, but less than others when the packet is small. RC4
consumes the least energy when the packet is large. Blowfish has a significant key expansion
overhead and it is not suitable for packet transmission although it is supposed to be a light-
weight encryption scheme with sufficient security [102]. Although, we can use the same key
for all packets to reduce the key expansion overhead of Blowfish, this requires an efficient
cache, state and key management, and hence increases the system complexity which is not
recommended.
2. Encryption with Different Key Sizes
In this measurement, we study whether the key size has an effect on energy consumption.
From previous section, we know that the packet size has an impact on the energy consumption
due to key expansion. In this study, we consider energy consumption due to encryption with
different key sizes for two cases, with and without the key expansion process. Without the
key expansion, we start to count the number of cycles for encryption after the key expansion
process.
Figure III.2 shows the amount of energy consumed per byte by each encryption with
different key sizes, packet sizes and ciphers without the key expansion. From the figure, we
can see that AES consumes different levels of energy when different key sizes are employed.
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Figure III.1: Energy consumption of encryption with different packet sizes
As we will see later, the reason for this is not the key size itself. With a longer key, the
encryption algorithm needs to do more “Rijndael” rounds according to the AES standard
which results in more computation and more energy consumption. The RC4 encryption
relies on a random number generator or a key stream generator to produce a series of keys.
Generating a key from the stream consumes very little energy; therefore, its performance
is almost independent of the key size. Thus, for RC4, a larger key size would only make a
successful brute-force key search harder without increasing the energy consumption.
In a manner similar to that of RC4, the energy consumption of RC5 encryption is almost
independent of the key size. With a longer key size, the encryption just needs a few more
additions and rotations of 32-bit words according to the algorithm. These operations are
very simple; hence, increasing the key size is unlikely to increase the energy consumption.
The computational load of Blowfish is also independent of the key size. No matter what the
key size is, Blowfish always runs 16 rounds of a Feistel-like network. However, Blowfish has
a heavy key expansion process before encryption as shown in Section III.B.1
We also study energy consumption of encryption with the key expansion process and
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Figure III.2: Energy consumption of encryption without key expansion
different key sizes. Figure III.3 shows the energy consumption. We can see that the energy
consumption of both RC4 and RC5 is not affected by the key size while AES is slightly
affected when the key size increases and the key expansion process is present.
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43
3. Encryption with Different Operational Rounds
The energy consumption of SKC algorithms or ciphers is also largely based on the difference
in operations or nature of the algorithms. Especially for block ciphers, the energy consump-
tion heavily depends on the recursive cryptographic algorithm which is normally a routine of
data manipulation or operational rounds. Block ciphers like AES and RC5 have a recursive
operation in which an input to the cipher goes through operational rounds. As the number
of the rounds increases, the energy consumption of the cipher increases.
From the previous study of the key size and the energy consumption, we saw that the
increase of key size only increases the energy consumption of AES. In fact, the increase of
key size changes the number of operational rounds of AES, but not RC5 or Blowfish. As
shown in Figure III.2, the energy consumption of RC5 is independent of the key size. This
is because RC5 has a fixed key expansion process that does not depend on the key size.
In contrast, the energy consumption of AES is increased mainly due to the increase of the
operational rounds as suggested by its standard. The key size has an impact on the AES key
expansion process, but the impact is much less compared to the AES round operations. The
standard AES requires the operational rounds to be 10, 12, and 14 for AES with 128, 192,
and 256-bit keys, respectively. Ignoring the standard, we can operate AES with 256-bit keys
with a lower number of rounds, but it may be subject to cryptanalysis attacks. In summary,
it can be seen that the energy consumption of block ciphers heavily depends on the number
of operational rounds, and the key size of a cipher may or may not be a factor in increasing
the energy consumption for SKC algorithms. It is known that a long key size has a large
impact on preventing the brute force search attack; however, it has only a slight effect in
increasing the energy consumption.
The number of operational rounds also has an impact on the security strength of the
cipher against attacks such as linear cryptanalysis [73] and differential cryptanalysis [29].
Depending on the algorithm, some algorithms may require higher numbers of rounds to
be robust against such attacks. We discuss this further in Chapter IV. A good security
algorithm should not perform too little or too many of operational rounds.
In this section, we study the performance of energy consumption of block ciphers, AES,
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RC5, and Blowfish. RC4 is not studied here since its algorithm is not based on operational
rounds. We consider the energy consumption due to encryption with a per-packet key
scheme. This means that for each data packet we need to perform key expansion and
encryption, and a different key is used for each packet. This scheme is commonly used in
wireless networks.
Figure III.4 shows the amount of energy consumption of encryption algorithms with
different numbers of rounds. The algorithms are used to encrypt a packet of 1024 bytes with
a 128-bit key. The energy consumption shown does not include that from the key expansion
process. We see that AES consumes energy at a higher rate than others as the number of
rounds increases. RC5 is probably a good cipher for constrained devices in terms of energy
consumption. However, it has a high overhead due to the key expansion as shown in the
previous section.
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Figure III.4: Energy consumption of encryption with different rounds
Figures III.5 and III.6 shows the energy consumption (using cycle counting approach) of
AES and RC5 as a function of packet size and operational rounds. We see that the energy
consumption of AES increases as the number of operational rounds increases regardless of
the packet size. The energy consumption of RC5 also increases as the number of rounds
increases. However, as the packet size increases, the increase of the energy consumption
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with the number of rounds becomes less significant.
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4. A Summary of SKC Performance
From the previous sections, we summarize the impact of the factors that affect the perfor-
mance of SKC encryption in Table III.1. It can be seen that AES and RC5 tend to be energy
efficient encryption algorithms for wireless devices since the impact of variable packet and
key sizes is low to medium. The AES has advantage over RC5 that the energy consumption
is slightly variable with the packet size. Despite its known vulnerability, RC4 is also likely to
be very energy efficient due to the medium impact of the packet size variation. Blowfish is
not suitable for wireless networks and devices because the variation of packet size has high
impact on the energy consumption.
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Table III.1: A Summary of Impact of Factors on SKC Performance
Factors RC4 AES RC5 Blowfish
Packet Size medium low medium high
Key Size no impact low no impact no impact
Round - medium low low
Vulnerability known unknown unknown unknown
Suitable for yes yes yes no
Wireless
C. ENERGY PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
Security algorithms based on public key cryptography (PKC) are computationally intensive.
They are unlikely to be used for data encryption for every packet. However, they are com-
monly used in exchanging a shared secret or for key exchange. The performance of the key
exchange algorithms are different based on what the underlying PKC algorithm is. PKC is
also used for digital signatures, which can only be implemented using PKC algorithms. The
performance of digital signature algorithms are also different based on the underlying PKC
algorithm used. In this section, we show the performance of the key exchange and digital
signature algorithms.
1. Shared Secret or Key Exchange Algorithms
Figure III.7 shows the energy consumption of RSA to exchange a secret. Basically, the secret
is encrypted using RSA by a sender and it is decrypted by a receiver. It is shown that the
energy consumption does not depend on the size of the secret. However, it depends on the
key size of RSA and whether it is encryption or decryption. RSA with a 2048-bit key con-
sumes more than twice the energy than 1024-bit RSA. However, doubling the key size does
not double the security of the algorithm [69]. Therefore, RSA may not be appropriate for
the future where more security strength may be needed with linearly increasing energy con-
sumption. Unlike secret key encryption, it is also clear that RSA encryption and decryption
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consume different amounts of energy. RSA encryption is quite simple and consumes very
little energy. This is suitable for constrained wireless devices in an infrastructure network
where there is a powerful device to do decryption.
Figure III.8 shows the amount of energy consumption of secret exchange using the
ECDH [122] algorithm. It is shown that exchanging different secret sizes affects the energy
performance. The ECDH algorithm can also be used with different elliptic curves which
yield different performances. An ECDH with a prime curve is based on prime number oper-
ations such as addition and multiplication which can easily be coded in software. An ECDH
with binary curves (Koblitz or Random) is based on binary operations which can easily be
embedded into a microprocessor. From the figure, it is shown that ECDH with a prime curve
consumes less energy than one with the Koblitz and Random curves respectively. Note that
energy consumption shown in the figure is only of the key exchange algorithm excluding that
of transmission. The performance of ECDH with binary curves can be improved if efficient
techniques based on binary algorithms are used [54].
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2. Digital Signature Algorithms
Figure III.9 shows the energy consumption of the RSA digital signature algorithms. The
digital signature is generated on 160 bits of hash generated from a message. Since the
RSA digital signature is based on the RSA encryption/decryption technique, it also has an
asymmetrical performance. The RSA signature verification algorithm (which is similar to
RSA encryption) consumes much less energy than the signature generation algorithm (which
is similar to RSA decryption) especially when the key size is large. This implies that the
verification algorithm is appropriate for constrained devices, but not the signing algorithm.
Figure III.10 shows the energy consumption of the ECDSA [59] algorithm. With increas-
ing key size, the ECDSA also consumes more energy. The level of energy consumption also
depends on the underlying elliptic curve. With the prime curve, the verification and sign-
ing algorithms consume approximately the same energy and also consume less energy than
other curves. However, the energy consumption of the verification and signing algorithms
with binary curves (Koblitz and Random) are much different and much higher than that
with the prime curve. Note that the ECDSA with a prime curve can be simply implemented
in software, and the ECDSA with a binary curve can be easily implemented in an embedded
microprocessor.
3. A Summary of PKC Performance
From previous sections, we summarize the impact of several factors on the performance
of PKC functions in Table III.2. We note that RSA encryption and signature verification
functions are very efficient since the variation of secret size has no or very low impact on
the energy consumption. However, RSA decryption and signature generation functions are
very inefficient for wireless devices. They are not energy efficient mainly due to the high
computation although the variation of secret or key size has no or minimal impact on the
energy consumption. ECC-based functions such as ECDH and ECDSA are efficient and are
usable for small wireless devices. This is because they are not sensitive to the variation of
the factors such as the secret or key size.
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Table III.2: A Summary of Impact of PKC Performance Factors
Factors Secret Size Key Size Energy Efficiency Complexity
RSA Encrypt no impact - high low
Decrypt no impact - low high
ECDH Prime low impact - high medium
Random medium impact - medium low
RSA Sign - very low impact low high
Verify - very high impact high low
ECDSA Prime Sign - low impact high medium
Verify - low impact high medium
Random Sign - medium impact high low
Verify - medium impact high low
D. ENERGY PERFORMANCE OF HASH FUNCTIONS
Hash functions are also as important as other cryptographic functions. They are used to
provide data integrity in digital signatures and public key certificates. They are also used
in conjunction with a secret key to provide message authentication and integrity to prevent
malicious message injection into or modification of messages in a wireless network. In this
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section, we study the performance of two popular hash functions (SHA-1 [81] and MD5 [94]).
Figure III.11 shows the energy consumption of SHA-1 and MD5 with different packet
sizes. It can be seen that SHA-1 consumes much more energy than MD5 especially when
the packet size is small. To create a digest of a packet, SHA-1 processes 512 bits as input
at a time, and continues for as many as 512-bit blocks as in the packet. Each 512-bit block
is passed through four rounds, each of which are identical and have 20 operations. Each
operation performs a non-linear function, adding, and shifting.
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Figure III.11: Energy Consumption of Hash Functions
MD5 also has four rounds of operations, but each round has only 16 operations. In
addition, each operation in MD5 is much simpler than that in SHA-1. This results in less
computation and energy consumption of MD5 than those of SHA-1. Note that the SHA-1
produces a 160-bit hash which is longer than a 128-bit hash produced by MD5. MD5 is
known to have security loopholes [44] unlike SHA-1 which has better security strength.
E. ENERGY PERFORMANCE OF MAC FUNCTIONS
In section III.D, we have shown the energy consumption of hash functions such as SHA-1
and MD5. The security service provided by hash functions is the message integrity in which
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a message receiver can only detect whether a message is modified. Unlike hash functions,
a Message Authentication Code (MAC) provides both message integrity and message au-
thentication in which the receiver can verify not only the integrity, but also the authenticity
of the message. Therefore, the MAC is commonly used in security protocols to verify the
sender identity and message integrity.
The MAC is an algorithm that is composed of a secret key and a one-way function such
as a cipher or a hash function. Examples of MAC functions with a cipher function and a hash
function are Cipher Block Chaining MAC (CBC-MAC) [28] and Hashed MAC (HMAC) [66],
respectively. The output size of the MAC depends on the output of the one-way function.
For example, using CBC-MAC with AES produces an output of 128 bits, and using HMAC
with SHA-1 produces an output of 160 bits.
In this section, we study the energy consumption of MAC functions as a function of packet
size. We study the HMAC function with SHA algorithm (HMAC-SHA) which produces
variable output sizes of 160, 256, 384, and 512 bits as well as CBC-MAC with AES which
produces a 128-bit output.
Figure III.12 shows the energy consumption of HMAC-SHA with variable output sizes
and 128-bit CBC-MAC-AES. It shows that the CBC-MAC uses much less energy than
HMAC-SHA. However, HMAC-SHA produces a larger output size than CBC-MAC-AES.
Additionally, with HMAC-SHA, we can produce variable output sizes, such as 160, 256, 384
and 512 bits. Note that we do not show the performance of 384-bit HMAC-SHA because
it uses the algorithm of 512-bit HMAC-SHA, and truncates the output of 512 bits to 384
bits; therefore, both 384-bit and 512-bit HMAC-SHA have identical performance. From
the figure, we can also see that the energy consumption per byte is reduced as the packet
size is increased. This shows that CBC-MAC-AES has much less overhead per packet than
HMAC-SHA.
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Figure III.12: Energy Consumption of HMAC-SHA and CBC-MAC
F. COMPARISON OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC LIBRARIES
Many cryptographic libraries that are commercially graded are freely available for implement-
ing security functions for software-based applications. They are also available in different
application programming interfaces (APIs), programming languages, and platforms. Due
to the variety of the libraries, performance of cryptographic functions in terms of energy
consumption is probably different. In this section, we perform a comparative study of three
different cryptographic libraries, OpenSSL [1], Cryptlib [2], and Crypto++ [3]. Their recent
versions are known so far to be efficient and without known vulnerabilities, and widely used
in the security research community.
1. Cryptographic Libraries
OpenSSL is probably the most commonly used library to implement cryptographic functions
since it is free for both commercial and non-commercial use. It was first implemented by Eric
A. Young and was known as SSLeay. The library was originally written for SSL protocol
transactions which employ several cryptographic functions. Later, it has been extended to
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include many more new cryptographic algorithms such as AES, RC4, and RC5. It also
includes some hand-tuned assembly code for performance optimization. The OpenSSL’s
primary API is for C programming, and it supports different processor architectures.
Cryptlib is another efficient and robust cryptographic library. It is written by a security
expert, Peter Gutmann. It can be easily integrated into any application using its easy-to-
code API. The API supports C programming on a variety of processor architectures. Like
OpenSSL, it contains some hand-tuned codes for performance improvement. However, it is
free only for non-commercial use.
Crypto++ is known to have the largest list of cryptographic functions available for devel-
opers. Its API supports C++ programming with hierarchical class structure and templates.
By using the C++ object-oriented scheme, it can be easily integrated into any C++ pro-
gram. However, the library is not tuned for optimal performance. It is free for any use.
More comparative descriptions of these three libraries can be found in [114].
Using these three cryptographic libraries, we conduct a comparative study on a laptop
PC platform with an Intel Pentium III 800 MHz CPU. We use the cycle-counting method
for energy measurement.
2. Comparative Results
Figure III.13 shows the energy consumption of 128-bit AES with different libraries. The
Cryptlib and OpenSSL libraries show results that are close to each other because both of
them are based on C programming language. However, Crypto++, which is based on C++
programming, consumes more energy for extra processing of memory/resource management
and error checking. When the packet size is small, Crypto++ tends to consume even more
energy. Due to memory management in C++, the overhead of allocating and de-allocating
small memory becomes significant. However, all of them show similar trends in that the
encryption consumes more energy per byte when it is used for small packet sizes, and the
consumption is decreased when the packet size is larger.
Figure III.14 and III.15 show results of RC4 and RC5 encryption. We can see that the
overhead of using C++ in Crypto++ becomes more significant when the packet size is small.
54
00.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
10 100 1000 10000
Packet Size (bytes)
En
er
gy
 
C
o
n
su
m
pt
io
n
 
(u
J/
by
te
)
cryptlib-aes-128
crypto++-aes-128
openssl-aes-128
Figure III.13: Energy Consumption of AES with Different Cryptographic Libraries
Compared to that of AES, the algorithms of RC4 and RC5 during the key expansion require
higher memory manipulation while AES utilizes a very simple key expansion.
The comparison of only OpenSSL and Cryptlib when used for 128-bit cryptographic
functions is shown in Figure III.16. As shown, they both have similar performance in terms
of energy consumption.
G. COMPARISON OF ENERGY MEASUREMENT METHODS
Three different methods that are commonly used for energy measurement for cryptographic
functions have been described in section III.A. We have already shown the performance
of cryptographic functions using the cycle-counting energy measurement method. Using
other methods may have different complexity and accuracy. In this section, we perform a
comparative study of different energy measurement methods. We compare the cycle-counting
method to that using external hardware that is specialized for energy measurement.
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Figure III.16: A Comparison of Energy Consumption between OpenSSL and Cryptlib
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1. Hardware-based Energy Measurement
Energy consumption of a cryptographic algorithm can also be measured using a dedicated
hardware or a data acquisition (DAQ) system. We use the DAQ system which includes
SCXI-1000 module chassis and SCXI-1100 32-channel analog input module from National
Instruments, Inc. to measure the amount of current drawn to a laptop while running cryp-
tographic operations. The DAQ system is capable of measuring 240,000 samples/sec. Based
on the experiment setting for our experiments and the specification of the SCXI-1100, the
absolute accuracy of our measurement is between ±1.265 mA (±0.0614%) and ±1.429 mA
(±0.0632%) (See Appendix for absolute accuracy calculation). We used at least 260,000
samples for each measurement, and we obtained a standard deviation of less than 0.82%.
We have set up our measurement test bed as shown in Figure III.17. We measure the
power drawn by the laptop during cryptographic operations. We use the same test codes
that are used in the cycle-counting method to run the cryptographic operations. We add a
programming interface to trigger the DAQ machine to start measurement just before and to
stop after the operation. The energy measured by the DAQ is the energy consumed by all
components of the laptop, including LCD, hard drive, and etc. We do 1000 experiments for
each test and find the average amount of energy consumption. We calculate the standard
deviation of energy consumption of all experiments, and find that it is less than 1%.
Laptop computer
Power Supply
Test Circuit
DAQ Machine
Trigger
Figure III.17: A Hardware-based Measurement Testbed
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2. Comparative Results
Figure III.18 shows the energy consumption of 128-bit cryptographic functions using the
OpenSSL library. It shows similar characteristics of energy consumption to those when using
the cycle-counting method in Figure III.1. However, the amount of energy consumed is higher
when using the DAQ system. Although it is proportional to the amount of computation, it
may include energy for LCD, hard disk, memory, and other devices during the cryptographic
operation. Figure III.19 shows the comparison between OpenSSL and Cryptlib libraries for
128-bit encryption. It shows results similar to those when we apply the cycle-counting
method as shown in Figure III.16.
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Figure III.19: A Comparison of Energy Con-
sumption between OpenSSL and Cryptlib
The comparison of using different methods for energy measurement is shown in Figure
III.20. The measurement of energy consumption uses the cycle-counting (on the left y-axis
with solid lines) and the DAQ-system (on the right y-axis with dashed lines). Both methods
show close performance, but on a different scale. The DAQ system method which measures
the total energy consumed by the device shows much higher energy consumption.
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Figure III.20: A Comparison of Using Different Energy Measurement Methods
H. COMPARISON OF TRANSMISSION AND ENCRYPTION ENERGY
In this section, we compare the the energy consumption due to transmission with that due
to encryption. To calculate the transmission energy, we use the energy transmission model
for point-to-point transmission in IEEE 802.11b WLANs proposed by Feeney and Nilsson
[45]. The transmission energy model is a linear model given by:
Tx Energy = 431µJ + 0.48µJ/bytes (III.1)
Rx Energy = 316µJ + 0.12µJ/bytes (III.2)
The transmission and reception energy have a fixed cost that is similar to that in encryp-
tion for key expansion process. We compare the transmission energy with our encryption
energy model as proposed in Section III.I. Figure III.21 shows the energy consumption per
byte of transmission and encryption as a function of packet size. It can be seen that the
transmission energy is higher than the encryption energy. This is because the transmission
requires a higher fixed cost or overhead to turn on the radio circuit on for transmission or
reception. Note however that PKC algorithms consume around an order of magnitude higher
energy than even transmission and reception.
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Figure III.21: A Comparison of Transmission and Encryption Energy
I. MODELING ENERGY CONSUMPTION
In our study in previous sections, we show the performance of cipher functions in term of
energy consumption. In this section, we come up with models of energy consumption of
the cipher functions in various settings. The energy consumption model is important in
that it can be used for simulation of mobile devices to estimate the energy consumption for
encryption. For example, for a given packet size and number of operational rounds, we can
estimate how much the energy consumption will be for securing packets using a cipher such
as AES or RC5. Additionally, from the packet size, we can estimate the energy consumption
of Hash and MAC functions.
1. The Energy Model
As we have shown in previous sections, energy consumption per byte of cryptographic func-
tions is a function of packet size. The characteristics of the energy consumption per byte is
closed to the linear-in-parameter exponential function of as a function of the natural loga-
rithm of the packet size. Therefore, we model the energy consumption per byte as a function
given by:
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² = α+ βe− lnx + γ ln xe− lnx, (III.3)
(III.4)
where ² is the energy consumption per byte (in µJ/byte), and α, β, and γ are the model
arguments, and x is the number of bytes.
To find the model arguments, we use curve fitting techniques to find the curve that best
fits the energy consumption from measurement. By trial-and-error, we found that the above
equation yields the best approximation or best fit for the measured energy consumption
for all cryptographic functions. We use the least-mean-square fitting [119] technique with
the above equation to find the energy model of each cryptographic function. We use the
R-square or Coefficient Correlation to find the goodness of fit [118] and we show this for
each function in later sections.
We can reduce the above equation into a short form, and we have the energy consumption
per byte as follows:
² = α +
β
x
+
γ lnx
x
. (III.5)
To calculate the energy consumption per packet, E, we multiply ² by x, the packet size
in bytes, to get:
E = β + αx+ γ ln x. (III.6)
From this model, we see that the energy consumption per packet of cipher functions is
almost linear as a function of packet size if we ignore the last term. The energy consumption
per packet, E, depends on three costs, the fixed cost, the first variable cost, and the second
variable cost. The fixed cost (β) is the energy overhead independent of the packet size, which
is from the computation required for the key expansion process. The first variable cost, α,
is dependent on the packet size. The second variable cost, γ, has a lower dependency on
packet size than the first variable cost.
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To make the encryption energy model simpler, one may ignore the second variable cost
since it is not significant compared to the first two costs as the packet size increase. The
model can be reduced into a simple form for encryption energy consumption per packet as
shown below:
E = β + αx. (III.7)
2. Modeling Energy Consumption of Ciphers
As we have seen in Section III.B.1, standard ciphers such as AES, RC4, and RC5 consume
different energy levels for different packet sizes. In this section, we use a curve fitting
technique and the energy model in the previous section to find the model arguments (α, β,
and γ) from the data in Figure III.1.
Table III.3 shows the arguments of the energy model for the cipher functions and the
goodness of curve fit in term of R-square values for each cipher. We can see that the fixed
cost, β, of RC4 is higher than that of other ciphers, and AES has a much lower fixed cost
than RC4 and RC5. However, AES has a high variable cost, α, compared to RC4 and RC5.
Table III.3: An energy model of fixed-round ciphers
Cipher R-Square α β γ
RC4 0.99999999 0.005352241 1.570481104 -0.019608391
RC5 0.99999996 0.010556583 1.052393166 0.006131408
AES-128 0.99999824 0.021548394 0.205036074 -0.000142957
AES-192 0.99999619 0.025066828 0.188190654 0.000362155
AES-256 0.99999616 0.028178031 0.201417806 0.000399011
We use the arguments in the table and plot the energy consumption per byte, ², of the
cipher functions with different packet sizes as shown in Figure III.22. The resulting figure
shows a good fit to the energy consumption from measurement in Figure III.1. We also show
the energy consumption per packet, E, in Figure III.23. From the figure, we can see that the
AES cipher consumes energy for encrypting a packet at a higher rate than RC4 and RC5 as
the packet size increases.
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Figure III.22: The energy per byte model of encryption algorithms
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Figure III.23: The energy per packet model of encryption algorithms
From the model shown in Figure III.22, AES-128 performs better than RC4 and RC5
when the packet size is less than 80 bytes. However, this may not be true since AES and
RC5 are block ciphers. When input data is not equal to an input block size, the data needs
to be padded to the input block size. The input block size of AES and RC5 is 16 bytes and
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8 bytes, respectively. Therefore, when a packet size is not of 16 bytes for AES or 8 bytes for
RC5, the energy consumption per byte is increased as it needs to encrypt more bytes than
the actual packet bytes.
Figure III.24 shows more granular measurements of energy consumption between packet
size of 56 and 88 bytes. We see that AES actually performs better than RC4 and RC5 when
the packet size is smaller than or equal to 64 bytes. Therefore, the above proposed model
can only be used to estimate the energy consumption of AES and RC5 when the packet size
is equal to the input block size. If the packet size is not equal to the input block size, we
need to calculate the energy consumption of the packet using the input block size that is
larger than the packet size using the energy model. For example, encrypting a packet of
size 65 bytes consumes energy that equals the energy for encrypting an 80-byte packet using
AES or a 72-byte packet using RC5.
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Figure III.24: The granular measurement of energy per packet
Figure III.25 shows the difference of energy consumption per byte between the granular
measurement and using the energy models of AES, RC4 and RC5. The model provides a
lower bound on the energy value.
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Figure III.25: Comparing the energy model to the granular measurement
3. Modeling Energy Consumption of Variable-Round AES and RC5
In Section III.B.3, we show the energy consumption of block ciphers such as AES, RC5, and
Blowfish. From the results, we can model the energy consumption per byte based on the
number of operational rounds and the packet size. We do not model the energy consumption
of Blowfish since it will not be used later in our work. In any case, it will not be hard to
model the energy consumption of Blowfish by using the same curve fitting technique.
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From Figures III.5 and III.6, we use the energy model to find the model arguments and
the goodness of fit for different numbers of operational rounds and packet sizes. Table III.4
shows the R-square values and the model arguments. From the table, we can see that the
fixed cost component, β, of AES is fairly constant, while that of RC5 is increased as the
number of operational rounds increases. This is because RC5 needs more computation for
key expansion as the number of operational rounds increases. The increase of the number
of rounds also increases the computation in the encryption process, but it is insignificant
compared to the key expansion process. The RC5 encryption process is only composed of
one XOR, one rotation and one addition operation for each round.
Using AES and RC5 with 14 rounds from Table III.4, we show the goodness of fit in
Figure III.26.
Table III.4: An energy model for variable-round AES and RC5
Cipher Round R-Square α β γ
AES 2 0.99999878 0.008447073 0.17643700 -0.000372095
4 0.99999901 0.011159903 0.17790412 -0.000295925
6 0.99999389 0.013974894 0.19367355 -0.004574693
8 0.99999923 0.016615498 0.17672169 -9.27346e-06
10 0.99999901 0.019417545 0.17720414 0.000132047
12 0.99999865 0.022534813 0.17499212 8.82427e-05
14 0.99999978 0.025258314 0.17694732 -0.000175299
RC5 2 0.99999829 0.007433666 0.25628641 0.002915492
4 0.99999860 0.007427554 0.38893572 0.005036759
6 0.99999960 0.007435403 0.52541720 0.002830619
8 0.99999860 0.007424251 0.64547943 0.007890188
10 0.99999986 0.007439175 0.79930360 0.001637456
12 0.99999993 0.009364852 0.93294880 0.000983088
14 0.99999997 0.007443185 1.07992994 0.000756165
16 0.99999989 0.010977162 1.19542920 0.002287954
From Table III.4, we can model energy consumption of variable-round AES and RC5.
Figure III.27 shows the figure of α and β cost components as a function of the number of
operational rounds (r). We do not consider γ since it has very little significance in the energy
model; therefore, we simplify our variable-round model to only α and β. From the figure,
it is clear that α of AES and β of RC5 are linear functions of the number of operational
rounds, and β of AES and α of RC5 are likely to be constant values. Using the curve fitting
technique, we compute α of AES and β of RC5 as follows in terms of r, the number of
operational rounds.
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Figure III.26: Goodness of fitting for AES and RC5 energy consumption
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Figure III.27: The Energy Model of Variable Round AES and RC5
AES: α = 0.005582889 + 0.001398641r, R-square = 0.999591509 (III.8)
β = 0.176701065 (III.9)
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RC5: α = 0.007433872 (III.10)
β = 0.116988204 + 0.067887565r, R-square = 0.999409297 (III.11)
By using α and β of AES and RC5 into Equation III.5, we have variable-round energy
models of AES and RC5 as follows.
AES: ² = 0.005582889 + 0.001398641r +
0.176701065
x
(III.12)
RC5: ² = 0.007433872 +
0.116988204 + 0.067887565r
x
(III.13)
From the above equations, we can clearly see that AES has a smaller overhead than
RC5 in terms of energy consumption as we discuss in Chapter II.A. As shown in Section
III.I.2, the overhead of RC5 is smaller as the packet size increases for each encryption when
operating using the standard number of operational rounds. When operating using more
rounds, as shown in Figures III.6 and III.5, the overhead of using RC5 becomes greater
while that of using AES is only slightly increased.
This can be clearly seen in Figure III.27. The overhead cost component, β, of RC5,
linearly increases as we increase the number of operational rounds while that of AES is
slightly increased. In contrast, the variable cost component, α, of RC5 is fixed while that of
AES is linearly increased as we increase the number of operational rounds.
In summary, we conclude two rules for RC5. First, RC5 should only be used for en-
crypting large-size packets due to its high overhead cost. Second, when using RC5 for large
packet size, we may increase the number of operational rounds to increase security strength
while the energy consumption is only slightly increased.
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4. Modeling Energy Consumption of Hash Functions
In Section III.D, we show the performance of hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD5 in terms
of energy consumption per byte, and we use this data to find an energy model for them. From
Figure III.11, we use the energy model and the curve fitting technique previously described
to find the energy arguments and the goodness of fit.
Table III.5 shows the model arguments and the goodness of curve fit indicated by the
R-Square values. We can see that SHA-1 has a much higher overhead (a fixed cost) than
MD5. SHA-1 also has a higher variable cost since it performs more computations than MD5.
Note that MD5 is known to have vulnerabilities.
Table III.5: An energy model for hash functions and packet size
Hash R-Square α β γ
SHA-1 0.99999324 0.00570248 1.61598213 0.06370296
MD5 0.99999999 -0.00000086 0.44510441 0.00036898
Using the arguments, we show the energy per byte model of hash functions in Figure
III.28, and it shows a good fit to that in Figure III.11.
5. Modeling Energy Consumption of MAC Functions
In Section III.E, we study the energy performance of MAC functions such as HMAC and
CBC-MAC. In this section, we model the energy consumption of the MAC functions using
the results from the study. We use the curve fitting technique and find the model arguments
and the goodness of fit in Table III.6.
From the table, we can see that the CBC-MAC-AES (using AES as cipher) has a much
lower fixed cost, β, than HMAC-SHA. The fixed cost of the HMAC-SHA also increases as
the size of the SHA output or digest is increased. The variable cost, α, of the HMAC-SHA
is also increased as the digest size increases; however, it is increased at a lower rate than the
fixed cost. The high overhead cost is due to the fact that SHA function already has a high
overhead cost, HMAC function multiplies the overhead cost in that it performs two SHA
functions internally to produce an output.
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Figure III.28: The energy per byte model of hash functions
Table III.6: An energy model for HMAC-SHA and CBC-MAC
MAC Output
(bits)
R-Square α β γ
HMAC-SHA 160 0.99892989 0.01097168 8.69571394 -0.30388744
256 0.99973079 0.01898750 10.23319142 -0.07599955
512 0.99991585 0.05268896 36.20744206 -1.35579240
CBC-MAC-AES 128 0.99552824 0.01912965 0.20543614 -0.01385172
We use the model arguments from the table and create a plot as shown in Figure III.29.
The plot shows the goodness of fit for energy consumption per byte of HMAC-SHA with
variable output sizes and 128-bit CBC-MAC-AES for different packet sizes.
J. CONCLUSION
It has been shown that several factors have an impact on the performance of security prim-
itives of both SKC and PKC. The packet size can significantly affect the key expansion (or
preparation) process of secret key encryption algorithms, although the key can be expanded
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and cached for later use to reduce the computational load. However, cache management may
not efficiently utilize the memory space especially in packet switching networks where data
are bursty. It also increases the system complexity and may introduce a security loophole
because of the buffered key. In addition, in wireless networks where packet error rates can
be high, a per-packet key scheme is often used to provide security services to each packet.
Thus, the packet size is a significant factor in determining the energy consumption.
The key size has only a slight impact on the performance of SKC algorithms such as
AES. As suggested by the AES standard, increasing the key size of AES requires an increase
of the number of operational rounds; hence, the computational load is increased. Thus, the
impact for increasing AES operational rounds is more significant than increasing the key
size. Compared to SKC, the key size of PKC algorithms can significantly affect the energy
consumption. It is because increasing the key size implies an increase of mathematical
operations, and hence increases the computation and energy consumption. The number of
operational rounds can only affect the performance of block ciphers whose encryption process
is recursive. Increasing the number of rounds does magnify the computation but increases
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security strength. Hash functions are often light-weight, and hence they are not of much
concern. Although, the packet size may impact the performance of hash functions, it is
insignificant compared to SKC and PKC functions.
We have shown that using different cryptographic libraries could also affect the perfor-
mance of energy consumption. It is shown that OpenSSL and Cryptlib show similar results
because they are both based on a C-programming interface which is lightweight. On the
contrary, Crypto++ uses the C++ programming interface which requires more computation
and more energy for error checking and memory/resource management.
We also use different methods of energy measurements to compare the performance of
different cryptographic libraries for cryptographic operations. We use the hardware-based
approach to measure the amount of current drawn to the laptop performing cryptographic
operations to be compared with the cycle-counting approach. The results show that both
methods can be used to measure the energy consumption of cryptographic operations. How-
ever, the cycle-counting approach yields only the amount of energy used by the CPU of a
mobile device such as a laptop. On the other hand, the hardware-based approach shows the
total energy consumed by the device including CPU, hard disk, LCD monitor and etc.
We also study and propose energy models for variable round AES and RC5 as well as
the MAC as a function of packet size. The models show that the energy consumption is a
linear-in-parameter logarithmic function with three components. These models can be useful
in performance evaluation of energy consumption of security protocols, and will later be used
in our study of security protocol performance.
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IV. SECURITY STRENGTH: MEASUREMENT AND MODELING
In the following sections, we discuss how we can characterize the strength of a security
protocol and how it can be estimated. Then, we propose a security strength model for use
in security strength estimation. The study in this chapter has been largely extended from
our work in [85].
A. MEASUREMENT OF SECURITY PROTOCOL STRENGTH
Fundamentally, the strength of a security protocol can be evaluated based on the underlying
security properties and primitives used in the protocol: such as ciphers, key size, operational
rounds, and mechanism of the protocol.
1. Strength from Cipher Algorithms
A cipher is a core component used in many security protocols. Each cipher is a unique
algorithm which mostly includes data manipulation, permutation, and diffusion which builds
the cipher strength. A cipher is known to be weak or insecure when it is possible to perform
shortcut attacks, e.g., attacks that are more efficient than exhaustive key search. Such attacks
are cryptanalysis attacks that analyze the cipher algorithm and try to reverse the ciphertext
to plaintext or discover the key. Examples of cryptanalysis attacks are differential and linear
cryptanalysis attack, weak key attack, related-key attack and Square attack [102]. Among
these attacks, the differential and linear cryptanalysis attacks are most efficient especially
for a block cipher like AES, RC5 and Blowfish. Details of these attacks are discussed later
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in this chapter.
2. Strength from Key Size
The size of the cipher key is also another factor that impacts the cipher security strength.
When a cipher used is strong and there is no short-cut attack, the most efficient attack is a
key search attack. The key search attack is simple and is most practical in that it can be
mounted to attack almost all ciphers. In the key search attack, attackers exhaustively search
for a key that matches a pair of known plaintext and ciphertext. Therefore, to strengthen
the protocol security, not only do we need a strong cipher, but also a key size that is long
enough to prevent the key search attack with a reasonable amount of time and resources.
The shorter the key size, the more vulnerable the cipher becomes to exhaustive key search
attacks.
Basically, the desired key size depends on how long we want our encrypted data to be
safe. The longer the key size, the longer the encrypted data is safe. It would approximately
take 5,300,000 years using a PC with a Pentium IV (3 GHz) to break a message encrypted
with a 80-bit symmetric cipher or about 1 year using 5 million PCs. Using a 128-bit key
with a provably secure cipher (e.g., AES) implies that the data can be protected until the
year 2075 [69]. Increasing the key size does increase the security strength, but may also
increase the amount of computation need by devices. Small devices such as wireless PDAs
may be resource constrained and hard pressed to perform such computation. This can be
more problematic if the devices have limited small battery capacity [99, 56]. Therefore, we
may need to reduce the security level or strength to an optimal level so that such devices
can operate longer.
3. Strength from Operational Rounds
The security strength of any secret key cipher is mainly based on the specific design of the
encryption algorithm. Most encryption algorithms follow a design where there are repeated
round operations. In each operational round, the algorithm manipulates data in two ways –
scrambling it to obscure the relationship between the plaintext and ciphertext and dissipating
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the effects of each plaintext bit over several bits of ciphertext. As more rounds are used, the
cipher tends to be more secure since it leaves no trails of the original data. The number of
operational rounds is often used to determine the strength of a cipher against cryptanalysis
attacks [102]. By employing the right number of operational rounds, one can ensure that
there is no shortcut attack that can be performed faster than an exhaustive key search. A
cipher with a smaller number of rounds than specified is weak against a shortcut attack such
as a linear or differential cryptanalysis attack [73, 29]. For example, it is required to use 10
rounds in AES with 128-bit block size as specified in the AES standard [14]. However, the
minimum number of rounds to provide adequate security is 6 rounds as described by the
author of AES [41].
4. Strength of Protocol Design
Besides the first three factors, the protocol design itself is most important. Security protocols
often have flaws due to improper design which leads to loopholes in the protocol. To eval-
uate a security protocol, we can use formalisms. The formalism is a mathematical method
using logic to verify whether the protocol is secure [75]. However, the use of formalism is
tedious and often has limitations that restrict the use to only security protocols with certain
conditions and assumptions [18, 51]. A modern and common way to evaluate the protocol
security is to use reasoning and arguments based on lessons learned from security protocol
design [24, 17]. A quantitative way to assess the strength level of a protocol is to assess
the strength of protocol security primitives such as the cipher and message authentication
code (MAC) used in the protocol. In our study, we only assess strength of security protocols
based on a quantitative method since formalisms are not the focus of our work. Note that
while it is important to ensure that protocol flaws do not exist, the objective of this work
is to demonstrate the effects on energy consumption rather than designing better security
protocols.
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5. Strength of Message Authentication Code
The security strength of a MAC or a hash function is often based on the output size or the
hash size. An attack on a hash function is successful if there are two identical hashes an
attacker can produce for two different messages. The equivalent exhaustive search is faster
due to the birthday paradox [110]. The attack requires computation of about 2x/2 hash
function outputs where x is the size of the output in bits in order to be successful with a
50% probability. Therefore, to be as secure as a 128-bit cipher, a hash function is required
to produce an output of at least 256 bits.
In IV.1, we provide a categorization of security strengths of protocols that make use of
different cryptographic primitives with different key sizes for the cipher and a hash output
size for the MAC. For example, a protocol with low security strength uses a cipher with
a 64-bit key and a MAC with a 128-bit output. This security setting is minimally secure
because researchers have proved that the primitives can be practically compromised using
a brute-force attack. For example, a 64-bit cipher (RC5) was broken using freely available
computing power from about 330,000 PCs (involving distributed.net) in about 4 years [4].
Successively larger key and hash output sizes make a security protocol stronger.
Table IV.1: Typical Key Sizes and Hash Sizes for Different Security Strengths
Strength Key size for cipher Hash size
Low 64 bits 128 bits
Medium 128 bits 256 bits
High 192 bits 384 bits
Very High 256 bits 512 bits
6. Estimation of Security Strength
The measure of security strength is usually computational – the amount of time and money an
attacker will need in order to break the security service. The computation which also implies
the security strength is often measured in MIPS-years, defined as the amount of computation
that can be performed in one year by a single DEC VAX 11/780. MIPS (million instruction
76
per section) is widely accepted as a unit to approximate computing power of any processor
(such as Intel Pentium) even if it uses instruction sets different from VAX. For example,
in one year, a single PC with a 3 GHz Intel Pentium processor approximately provides the
computing power of 3,000 MIPS-years or 0.003 MMYs.
The security strength or the MIPS-years required to break a cryptographic primitive
indicates how long the data protected by the security protocol is secure. In the study by
Lenstra and Verheul [69], the time to break a cipher is quantitatively compared to the time
to break a DES cipher, the first standard block cipher internationally used since 1976 [5].
To break 56-bit DES, Lenstra and Verheul estimate that it requires about 0.5 MMYs. In
1997, it was first discovered that DES can be cracked using 3500 PCs and 4 months (using
an exhaustive search for a key) [69]. In 1999, DES was cracked in less than 24 hours using a
specialized hardware, “Deep Crack” [49], and computing resources from distributed.net [4].
From these evidences, it shows that 0.5 MMYs for cracking DES may be an overestimate.
From the MMYs required for DES cracking, we can estimate the amount of MMYs
required to crack any cipher using an exhaustive key search, based on the key size used. The
MMY estimation considers the increase of computing power which is approximately doubled
every 18 months according to Moores Law [78]. The estimation also considers the amount
of budget that an adversary may have and the declined price of CPU and memory to build
an infrastructure for the brute-force attack.
In summary, the estimation using MMY is somewhat practical and can be used as a
reference for selecting the key size of a cipher or the hash size based on what level of security
strength is needed to prevent a brute force key search attack. Although, this estimation
is applicable to a cipher or a crypto-primitive, the strength of a security protocol which is
based on its underlying crypto-primitive can be associated to be the same as that of the
crypto-primitive if protocol flaws do not play a huge role in the weakness of the protocol.
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B. STRENGTH MEASUREMENT BASED ON SECURITY ATTACK
There are several types of security attacks, but only few are known to be effective and
even practical. In this section, we describe some common security attacks and analyze the
strength of ciphers used in our work against such attacks.
1. Brute Force Key Search Attack
The easiest and most effective attack is a brute force key search attack. In such attack, one
obtains a plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext under a secret key, and simply tests each
of all keys until a match is found. If the key size is n bits long, there are 2n possible keys
to test. This attack requires minimal storage/memory and it can be parallel. Therefore, the
attack can be more effective by incorporating more than one computer. This attack is known
to be the most practical since it can be mounted against any cipher. However, this attack
is only effective when the key size is small. For example, RC5 with a 64-bit key was broken
using the key search attack which takes 1,757 days with 331,252 participating computers.
However, it would take only 790 days with approximately 45,998 2GHz AMD Athlon XP
machines running 24 hours a day [6].
The efficiency of this attack depends heavily on the key size used. As recommended
by NIST, a key size of 128 bits is safe for today’s security and it would be safe until 2075
using the approximation proposed by Lenstra and Verheul [69]. In Figure IV.1, we estimate
the amount of computing required in MMY (on the left y-axis), and the year (on the right
y-axis) that it would be broken for a given key size using the same approximation technique.
2. Cryptanalysis Attacks
A cryptanalysis attack is an attack that uses a mathematical model to analyze the pattern
of how a plaintext is “changed” to a corresponding ciphertext. It is a shortcut attack where
the attack can be faster than the key search attack if it can be practically used. The goal
of the attack is to find the “correlation” among a set of plaintexts, a set of ciphertexts and
the key. There are two common cryptanalysis attacks, differential and linear cryptanalysis.
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Figure IV.1: Required Computing Power for Brute Force Key Search Attack
Differential cryptanalysis was first introduced by Biham and Shamir [29], and has been
widely used to analyze most block ciphers such as RC5 and AES. The basic idea in this
technique is to find the “difference” between two chosen plaintexts and their corresponding
ciphertexts. The plaintexts, with difference ∆P , are chosen such that the difference of
the ciphertexts, ∆C, has a specific value with better than average probability. The tuple
(∆P,∆C) is called a characteristic. Depending on the technique used in the analysis and the
cipher, certain bits of the key can be derived by analyzing the behavior of the characteristic.
The second common cryptanalysis attack is linear cryptanalysis pioneered by Matsui
[73]. The basic idea is to find correlation among certain bits of plaintext, ciphertext and key
that has a probability of less than or more than 0.5, which is called bias. With a certain
bias, the correlation or linear approximation can lead an attacker to find information about
the key. The cryptanalysis attack can be incorporated with a related key attack in which a
set of keys is used for the attack, and the set is chosen with a particular property.
The cryptanalysis attack is often used with variants of a cipher, which can be a reduced-
round cipher. It is easy to attack a cipher with a small number of rounds. As the number of
operational rounds increases, the correlation complexity among plaintexts and ciphertexts
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grows exponentially. The attack commonly works for a small number of rounds. Increasing
the number of rounds until it is impossible to attack or the attack is less effective than
the key search attack is a common way of securing a cryptosystem. Fundamentally, the
cryptanalysis attack is ineffective if it requires 2n−1 operations or more for an n-bit key.
From the above analysis, we propose a new security parameter to measure the capability
of ciphers against the cryptanalysis attack. The Cipher Robustness or simply called the
Robustness is the strength of the cipher to prevent the cryptanalysis attack. The Robustness
is the product of the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs and the number of operations
required from the cryptanalysis attack.
Cipher Robustness = Plaintext-Ciphertext Pairs×Operations
As the number of required plaintext-ciphertext pairs grows, the possibility that an at-
tacker can collect those is decreased or impractical; thus, increasing the cipher robustness.
In addition, the number of required operations is another factor that impacts the possibility
of the attack. With a certain amount of available computing power, increasing the number of
required operations decreases the ability of attackers from analyzing the cipher. Therefore,
increasing the required number of operations does increase the cipher robustness.
Figure IV.2 shows the Robustness of AES(k,m) and RC5(k,m) where k is the key size in
bits and m is the plaintext size in bits. The Robustness of AES is derived from [72, 41, 47],
and that of RC5 is derived from [61, 30, 33]. From the figure, we see that the attack is more
difficult as the number of operational rounds increases. Second, we also see that attacking
AES is more difficult than RC5 as the number of rounds increases. However, one increased
round of AES requires about 60% to 175% more energy than RC5 as shown in Figure III.4.
Third, we can see from the figure that the attack of 256-bit AES with 9 rounds is more
efficient than that with 8 rounds because the attack incorporates the Related Key attack
of the long key size (256 bits) [47]. Therefore, as also recommended by AES authors, the
number of operational rounds should be increased as the size of keys increased. Lastly, to
make such attacks impossible, more than 10, 12, and 14 rounds are recommended for AES
with 128-, 192-, 256-bit keys, respectively, and 16 rounds for RC5.
In comparison with the key search attack, Figure IV.3 shows the required computing
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power for a typical cryptanalysis attack against AES and RC5. If we assume that the
amount of available plaintext-ciphertext pairs is unlimited (which is unlikely to happen in
the real world), such attacks can be much more powerful than the key search attack since
they require much less computational effort.
3. Modeling the Cipher Robustness
In the previous section, we described the cryptanalysis attack for block ciphers such as
AES and RC5. The cryptanalysis attack relies on the number of operational rounds and the
amount of available plaintext-ciphertext pairs. From this two parameters, we proposed a new
parameter called Cipher Robustness. In this section, we model the Cipher Robustness based
on the the number of operational rounds of a cipher. From the data, we use curve fitting
techniques called least-mean-square (LMS) [119]. We derive the model of the Robustness.
We use the R-square or the Correlation Coefficient value as a parameter to evaluate the
goodness of the fitting [118].
The model is necessary for the calculation of the number of operational rounds based on
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the required Robustness of a particular security level. For example, for a given security level,
we calculate the Robustness, and we use the Robustness to derive the required number of
operational rounds. We then operate the cipher with this number of rounds with the guar-
antee that the cipher will protect information with the given security level. The definition
of the security level will be described in Chapter VI in more detail.
In Figure IV.2, we show the Robustness of AES and RC5 against cryptanalysis attacks.
We can see that the Robustness of RC5 is exponential with the number of operational rounds.
Thus, the Robustness model for RC5 is
RC5 Robustness = αeβr
where α and β are the model arguments, and r is the number of operational rounds.
We also model the Robustness of AES with a 128-bit key (AES-128) and a 256-bit key
(AES-256). The Robustness of AES with a 192-bit key is similar to that with a 256-bit key.
We can see from Figure IV.2 that the log function of the Robustness tends to be exponential
as a function of the number of operational rounds. Thus, we can model the Robustness of
AES as
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AES Robustness = exp(αeβr).
We have tested several curve functions, and we have found that the aforementioned
functions yield the highest R-square value. Using the LMS fitting on the above functions,
we find the arguments for RC5, AES-128, and AES-256 and the R-square value as shown in
Table IV.2.
Table IV.2: Robustness Model for AES and RC5
Cipher α β R-Square
RC5 8.45715666e-8 6.28948775 0.99886109
AES-128 0.18749891 0.97279156 0.98547977
AES-256 1.00967057 0.67885200 0.99790237
From the table, we can summarize as follows. An increase of one round of AES-128
would increase the Robustness more than one round of RC5 since the Robustness of AES is
exponentially increased as the number of rounds increases. One round of AES-256 increases
the Robustness less than AES-128 due to the fact that attacks on AES-256 are more efficient
than those on AES-128 and AES-192 (the β of AES-128 is higher than that of AES-256).
In Figure IV.4 and IV.5, we show the cipher robustness from the cryptanalysis and our
robustness models for RC5, AES-128 and AES-256, respectively. We will later use these
models to derive the number of operational rounds used by a cipher to provide a given
security level.
4. RC4 Cryptanalysis Attack
RC4 is a stream cipher and the cryptanalysis of RC4 is different from that of block ciphers
such as AES and RC5. The cryptanalysis attacks are related-key attack, “tracking” attack,
and statistical analysis attack [52, 77, 10]. The attacks try to predict the states of the key
stream; however, it is not efficient if the RC4 word size is more than 8 bits which is widely
used for RC4. The most successful and practical attack is the Fluhrer-Mantin-Shamir (FMS)
attack, where they found a weakness in the key scheduling algorithm (KSA) of RC4 [48].
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The FMS attack is practical as demonstrated by Stubblefield et.al. [111], and has been
implemented in many attack tools, such as Airsnort [7] and WEPcrack [8]. The FMS attack
has discovered two weaknesses in RC4, the invariance weakness and the initial vector (IV)
weakness.
The invariance weakness is the existence of specific patterns, which are invariant with
respect to the KSA. That means if we can find some pattern in RC4 keys, we can also find
a similar pattern in the key stream output with high probability. The RC4 keys that have
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such patterns are weak keys. Using this weakness, attackers only find the desired pattern in
the ciphertext (which is commonly an XOR between the key stream and a plaintext), and
they can determine the secret key. The complexity of this attack is an Θ(2n+l), where n is
the word size in bits and l is the key size in bytes. Typically, RC4 has 8-bit word size, n = 8
and a 128-bit key, l = 16, and the complexity of the attack is Θ(224).
The IV weakness occurs when RC4 is used in a common mode in which an IV is simply
concatenated to a secret key to produce an RC4 key. In this mode, the secret key can be used
on a long term basis, and one can only change the IV to generate a different RC4 key. The
IV is not a secret; therefore, it is exposed to attackers. With some known IVs to produce
RC4 keys, an attacker can analyze key stream outputs, and determine the rest of the RC4
keys whose part is the long-term secret key. The complexity of this attack is Θ(2n+8), which
is independent of the key size (l). This attack has been used against the WEP protocol,
which uses the aforementioned common mode, and it makes WEP unsafe for any key size.
The complexity of the WEP attack is Θ(216), where the word size (n) is 8 bits long.
Rivest, the creator of RC4, recommends the prevention of these attacks by discarding
the first 256 bytes of the key stream output since these bytes can be used by the key-related
analysis. Also, the key and the IV should be pre-processed before they can be used as
the RC4 key [93]. The discarding and pre-processing can prevent the IV weakness attack;
however, as described by Fluhrer et.al., the invariance attack is still possible with lower
probability [48]. The more the first several bytes are discarded, the less the successful rate
of the invariance attack.
5. Hash and MAC Function Attacks
There are three common attacks for hash functions, which are based on brute force search,
the pre-image attack, the second pre-image, and the collision attack.
The pre-image attack is that given the hash of the message M , h(M), one is trying to
find M ′ such that h(M ′) = h(M). With the brute force search, the attack tries to find all
possible outputs of hash function or digests. With the output size of n bits, the required
number of operations is about 2n−1 on the average. The second pre-image attack is that given
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h(M) and message M , one is trying to find M ′ such that h(M ′) = h(M). The difficulty of
the finding is as hard as that of the pre-image attack.
The collision attack is more efficient than the first two attacks. Instead of trying to find
a match from a given hash, one is trying to find a pair of messages, M and M ′, such that
h(M) = h(M ′). This is similar to the problem of how many people would be in a room so
that two people have the same birthday. The answer is 23 people as opposed to 183 (if we
use the brute-force search). This attack is also called birthday paradox attack. Thus, with a
n-bit output, the attack approximately requires only 2n/2.
Due to the birthday paradox attack, maintaining the security level of a hash function
requires the output or hash size to be at least twice as much as the size of the secret key.
Table IV.3 shows hash sizes of common hash functions, the required operations, the MMYs
of the operations, and the collision time1 of the birthday paradox attack.
Table IV.3: The estimated collission time of hash functions under the birthday paradox
attack
Hash Output Size Required MMY Collision
Operations Time
MD5 128 bits 264 128 15.57 days
SHA-1 160 bits 280 8.38E6 2796 years
SHA-256 256 bits 2128 2.36E21 7.87E17 years
SHA-384 384 bits 2192 4.35E40 1.45E37 years
SHA-512 512 bits 2256 8.03E59 2.67E56 years
From the table, it is suggested that we select the right hash function to generate the
hash output according to our security need. If our security need is that we can prove the
integrity of a messsage for the period of 16 days since the hash of the message is generated,
we should not use MD5. However, a recent attack has discovered a shortcut attack which
makes the collision time even less [116], and it is proved by an implementation that we can
find the MD5 collision within 8 hours using a 1.6 GHz Intel Pentium PC [64]. SHA-1 also
has a known shortcut attack which requires about 269 operations to find the SHA-1 collision
[117].
1The collision time is calculated using one 3 GHz PC capable of having about 3000 MIPS
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The attack for MAC functions is a bit different from hash functions since the MAC
functions requires a key to generate a message digest. In addition to those on hash functions,
attacks on MAC functions are related to and limited by the key size. Sometimes the attack
is specific to the algorithm of the MAC function. However, the common attacks on MAC
functions can be divided into two categories: the forgery attack and the key recovery attack
[89].
The forgery attack tries to predict the output of the MAC function of the message M ,
MacK(M), without knowing the k-bit key K. The simplest forgery attack is theMAC guess-
ing attack that one selects an arbitrary message and a randomly chosen MAC output, and
hopes that the verification of the message matches the MAC output. Ideally, the probability
of success is 1/2n, where n is the MAC output bits. The attack needs on the average 2n−1
operations for correct verification of the forgery. Such attacks can be avoided by making n
sufficiently large and/or limiting the number of forgery attempts on a given key. Without
knowing the key, the birthday paradox attack can also be used which requires about 2n/2
forgery attempts for a given key.
The key recovery attack to trying to find the keyK from a number of the pairs (M,MacK(M)).
The simplest key recovery attack is the brute-force search attack which can be used to re-
cover the key from a few known (M,MacK(M)) pairs (about k/n pairs). The key recovery
attack can be specific to how the MAC fucntion is constructed. More details of attacks on
MAC functions can be found in [89, 76, 35].
Table IV.4 shows the security level of MAC functions, WPA Michael, 802.11i CBC-MAC,
and HMAC, equivalent to that of ciphers, and the number of forgery attempts2 which an
adversary may need to perform for the forgery attack, and the estimated key lifetime3.
From the table, it is suggested that the key used with the MAC functions be changed be-
fore the number of the plaintext-MAC processing reaches the forgery attempts. The number
of forgery attempts can also be used with, for example, a failure counter as a countermeasure
to limit the number of attempts from an adversary.
Note that Michael is a 64-bit MAC used in Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) standard while
2We assume the MAC key is not changed during the period of the forgery attempt.
3To calculate the key lifetime, we assume one forgery attempt takes about 200 msec
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Table IV.4: The estimated key lifetime of key in MAC functions under the forgery attack
MAC Output Equivalent Forgery Estimated
Size Secret Size Attempts Key Lifetime
Michael 64 bits 20 bits 220 58 hours 4
CBC-MAC 64 bits 32 bits 232 9942 days
HMAC-SHA1 160 bits 80 bits 280 2.798E18 days
HMAC-MD5 128 bits 64 bits 264 4.270E13 days
CBC-MAC (Cipher Block Chaining-MAC) is used in WPA version 2 (WPA2) standard. The
equivalent secret size of Michael is lower than 32 bits because it has a known weakness [46].
The weakness is further described in the next section. The WPA2 CBC-MAC output is the
first 64 bits of the output of an 128-bit AES with CBC-MAC.
C. ENERGY AND ROBUSTNESS
In previous sections, we show that the increase of security level, which increases the Cipher
Robustness, increases the amount of energy consumption. In this section, we compare the
energy consumption and the Cipher Robustness of AES and RC5. AES is a newer cipher
than RC5, and it is known to be stronger from our study. In Section IV.B.3, we show that
the Cipher Robustness of AES is higher than that of RC5 as one operational round is added.
Figure IV.6 shows the energy consumption as a function of the Cipher Robustness of AES
and RC5.
From the figure, we see that one additional operational round of RC5 slightly increases
the energy consumption and linearly increases the Cipher Robustness. However, one addi-
tional operational round of AES linearly increases the energy consumption, but exponentially
increases the Cipher Robustness.
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Figure IV.6: Energy Consumption VS Cipher Robustness
D. SECURITY STRENGTH ANALYSIS OF WLAN SECURITY
PROTOCOLS
In this section, we show an example of how we can estimate the security strength of a wireless
security protocol. We will evaluate the security of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol,
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and the recently standardized IEEE 802.11i or WPA version
2 (WPA2). These are standard protocols for providing security services in Wireless Local
Area Networks (WLANs).
1. WLAN Security Protocols
WEP was first used as the standard security protocol in WLANs. WEP employs RC4 cipher
as the underlying crypto engine for data encryption and authentication. WEP has known
weaknesses partly due to the improper use of RC4 and the key generation which simply
concatenates a secret to a counter (an initial vector). This has lead to a practical attack
on WEP [111]. WPA was then standardized to fix the WEP weaknesses. WPA introduces
TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol), a key mixing process to mitigate the weakness
of the key generation, but still uses RC4 as a cipher. RC4 is known to be weak due to its
key scheduling algorithm, the process that expands the secret key of any size to 256 bytes
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before generating a stream of random numbers for encryption [48]. Therefore, the WPA2
standard was released in July 2004 to be used as a strong, flawless security protocol for
WLANs. WPA2 is totally re-designed and utilizes AES as the underlying cipher in Counter
with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode [120].
For message integrity, WEP employs the Cyclic Redundancy Check-32 (CRC-32) which
is not a MAC and cannot be used for strong message authentication. WPA utilizes a MAC
function known as Michael that produces a hash output of 64 bits. Due to its simplicity and
lightweight, Michael has been subject to active attacks that actually reduces the security of
the output from 64 bits to 20 bits (instead of 32 bits due to the Birthday Paradox attack) [46].
In the attack, one simply tries to test two different messages that have similar corresponding
outputs. As more tries are tested, one can find a collision where two different messages
yield the same output for a given Michael key. This Michael design is intended to have low
security since Michael is needed to be compatible and affordable for legacy devices which
have low computing power.
The re-designed WPA2 employs a better MAC, CBC-MAC which is stronger and has no
known weakness. It utilizes the AES cipher in CBC mode to generate MAC from the upper
64 bits of ciphertext. This enables a verification process from ciphertext received before
actually decrypting it. The summary of standard security protocols for 802.11 WLANs is
shown in Table IV.5.
Table IV.5: Summary of Security Protocols for WLANs
Security WEP WPA WPA2/IEEE 802.11i
Services WEP-40 WEP-104
Encryption 40-bit RC4 104-bit RC4 RC4 128-bit TKIP 128-bit AES CCM
MAC N/A N/A 64-bit Michael 64-bit CBC-MAC
2. WLAN Security Protocol Analysis
Based on the specification of WLAN security protocols, we calculate the time required to
break a security protocol with computing power equivalent to a typical high-performance PC
available today which is an Intel Pentium IV 3 GHz CPU. The security strength of ciphers
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are shown in Table IV.6. The time can be reduced if multiple PCs are used together to break
the security in a distributed network. From the table, we see that 40-bit WEP can be broken
in less than an hour using one PC. As the key size increases, more computations are needed
to break the protocol. The MAC of WPA can be quickly broken since Michael is susceptible
to active attacks where an attacker tests two messages sent to a receiver with the hope that
the messages have the same output, although more tests are needed for the attack to be
successful. Therefore, it is required by the IEEE 802.11i standard to use countermeasures
such as an integrity check failure counter to monitor such attacks when Michael is used [16].
The maximum number of the counter should not exceed the number of forgery attempts as
shown in the previous section. WPA2 is the strongest protocol which has been rigorously
reviewed for many years by the 802.11i working group and security experts.
Table IV.6: Strength of WLAN Security Protocols
Protocol MAC Strength Cipher Strength Overall
Forgery Attempts MMY Broken Year Strength
WEP-40 N/A 7.629E − 6 Now Very Low
WEP-104 N/A 1.407E14 2044 Low
WPA 220 2.361E21 2075 Medium
WPA2 232 2.361E21 2075 High
In this analysis, we have not considered the protocol flaws in measuring the security
strength. WEP uses ICVs as MACs and they are known to be useless. Consequently we
do not estimate the strength of the MAC here. Attacks against ciphers that are better
than exhaustive search have also not been considered primarily because of the difficulty of
estimating the security strength. For example, the FMS attack could drastically reduce the
amount of time to break 104-bit RC4. The attack is based on the usage of weak keys and
this is hard to estimate. Additionally, TKIP is assumed to be as secure as AES although it
employs the weak RC4 algorithm since no attack has known to be faster than the exhaustive
key search attack at the time of this writing.
91
E. CONCLUSION
The strength of a security protocol can be measured based on the underlying crypto-
primitives used, key size, the number of operational rounds, and the protocol design. Com-
monly used primitives are the cipher and the hash function or message authentication code.
The strength of the cipher often relies on the key size, operational rounds and algorithm
used. The key size is a countermeasure to the brute-force search or the key search attack
while the operational rounds and the algorithm are countermeasures to cryptanalysis at-
tacks. The strength of hash or MAC functions only relies on the output sizes. To have the
same security level of the cipher against the brute-force search attack, the output size should
be twice as much as the cipher key size. Applying the security strength analysis to existing
WLAN standard protocols shows that the current WEP and WPA are not so secure while
the newest standard, WPA2 or IEEE 802.11i, is fairly secure against all known attacks.
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V. AN ENERGY EFFICIENT SECURITY FRAMEWORK
We have shown that providing security services can consume different amounts of energy
depending on a variety of security parameters such as number of operational rounds, packet
sizes per encryption, key sizes, and choice of ciphers. We have also shown that security
services can be provided at different levels, each of which correspond to different security
strength or robustness. A requirement of high security strength needs a high amount of
energy for computation. From these observations, it is possible that we can trade off security
strength to provide higher energy efficiency to wireless and limited battery-power devices.
We may lower the security strength to a sufficient level in order to conserve more energy,
and hence to prolong the devices’ battery life.
In this chapter, we propose an energy efficient security framework which proposes meth-
ods to reduce the amount of energy consumption. We also apply such methods to security
protocols to achieve energy savings while maintaining the security level of the protocols.
A. METHODOLOGIES
Based on the evaluation of energy consumption of security primitives, we see that there is
potential for reducing the energy consumption of security protocols for wireless networks.
We propose three different methods by which energy can be conserved that can be applied
towards the design of energy efficient security protocols.
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1. Method 1: Eliminating/Replacing Most Energy Consuming Parts
The first and obvious way to reduce energy consumption is to eliminate or replace the most
energy consuming part of existing standard protocols. Besides transmission and reception
of packets, the most energy consuming part of the security protocols is due to cryptographic
functions such as encryption, key generation, and digital signatures. From our findings
as described earlier, different primitives consume different amounts of energy. Looking at
several standard protocols, we also find that most of them allow different primitives to be
used during a protocol transaction, but the protocols are not adaptive after a primitive has
been selected for use for a whole session. However, we believe it is possible to carefully select
a combination of primitives to be used in a single session, which is more energy-efficient than
a standard one. As an example, assuming that both RC4 and AES with 128 bit keys provide
similar security levels, it is better to use AES for shorter packets and RC4 for longer packets
to provide confidentiality as it is in current protocols.
2. Method 2: Modifying Protocol Primitives and Transactions
The second method to reduce energy consumption of security protocols is to modify the
protocols themselves. Beyond changing the security primitives, we can modify the protocol
primitives (messages) and transactions. Some protocols are not energy-efficient since they
have to exchange several primitives and messages; for example, a Kerberos client needs to
exchange at least six messages before it can access network services [80] and employing it on
a WLAN may result in a larger consumption of energy than required. However, the protocol
modification should not change the security level already defined in the existing protocol. To
ensure security equivalence, formal methods are often used to verify security strength and
to find flaws of a protocol. A well-known formal method is BAN logic [37]; however, it has
limitations in that it does not capture the aspects of real systems [18, 51]. In a different way,
we can also show security equivalence by reasoning or arguments based on lessons learned
[24, 17]. To implement protocol modifications and achieve energy savings, we can make use of
security protocol standards that allow us to ”plug-in” any security transaction. One example
of such a protocol for authentication is the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [31].
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3. Method 3: Using an Entirely New Security Framework
The last method we suggest is to take the greenfield approach where we start from scratch
and come up with security protocols that consume the least energy. Such a method should
offer tunable and adaptive security services. As an example, consider data integrity for
packets over a WLAN. MD5 is more efficient than SHA-1 for shorter packets, but it is also
less secure. MD5 may still be used for shorter packets that do not need a lot of security
(it would be sufficient if the security is not breached for a few days instead of a few years).
Another example is a modified communications/security protocol that adapts itself to chan-
nel conditions. For instance, knowing that the channel is bad, short probe packets can be
transmitted with a low level of security (simply providing confidentiality for the duration
of the probes). Both of these examples require the development of a policy for determining
how much security is required for a given communication session (what is reasonable) and
how this can be mapped into the appropriate primitives. We believe this method that tunes
the security protocol based on a policy and known performance measures would significantly
reduce energy consumption due to adaptive security provisioning and may also reduce the
energy consumed by signal/message transmission. We develop an example in the next chap-
ter, but do not consider channel conditions there. We also do not address the development
of policies in this dissertation nor do we consider optimality of the solution.
4. A Summary of Methodologies
A comparison of the three energy saving methods for security protocols is shown in Table
V.1. From the table, the first method improves the energy saving by simply analyzing
several existing security protocols and changing some protocol components. This method
will still be compliant with existing standards; however, the energy saving is probably small.
The second method probably offers more energy saving. However, it may or may not be
backwards compatible with existing protocols, but it is within the scope of the standard.
This method may also introduce a little complexity. The third method starts from scratch
and creates a security protocol that utilizes a new energy efficient framework. This method
introduces complexity ranging from medium to high and probably will not comply with any
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existing standards; however, we believe it has the potential to conserve the most energy.
Table V.1: A Comparison of Different Energy Saving Methods
Methodology Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
Complexity low low medium-high
Compliance yes maybe no
Adaptability no no yes
Energy Savings low medium high
Another method has been proposed by many researchers as one of the energy-efficient
methods, although this method is not related to security level adjustment [84]. This method
aims to reduce the size of transmitted messages of a security protocol. It aims at reducing
the energy consumed by the message transmission using several compression techniques.
Though the compression method probably offers some energy saving, we will not use this
method to reduce energy consumption of security protocols as it is not specific to security
protocols alone.
5. Applying the Framework
In next sections, we show two simple examples of using the proposed energy saving framework
described in Section V.A to conserve energy for security provisioning in WLANs. In the
first example, we use Method 1, where we replace the most energy consuming part with
something that consumes lesser energy. This example looks at a very simple variation of the
handshake protocol for SSL where the energy consuming RSA signature algorithm is replaced
by ECDSA, but other RSA processes are left as they are. In the second example, we employ
a technique that is a part of Method 2. We adaptively change the encryption algorithm
in a simple home WLAN. In the current WLAN standard, every packet transmitted over a
wireless channel can be encrypted with RC4 algorithm in the secure mode [13]. However, to
provide ”reasonable” security, the encryption needs not be equally applied to all packets. As
an example, if only confidentiality services are required for some packets, encryption should
only be applied to confidential data packets, and not to control and management packets
such as the beacon and acknowledgment packets. Also if the packet size is small, we may use
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AES instead of RC4 since AES has less overhead [88]. Employing both RC4 and AES and
switching between them are not possible in the current WLAN standard, but this example
shows the potential energy savings that can be achieved under a good framework.
B. A VARIATION OF TLS AUTHENTICATION FOR ENERGY SAVING
In this section, we utilize our proposed framework to an existing standard security protocol
to be more energy efficient. As we described in Section V.A, one of the methods suggested
by our framework is a replacement of security primitives that consume more energy than it
is necessary.
Based on the framework, we propose the replacement method to the authentication pro-
tocol of Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol or the Handshake protocol. The Handshake
protocol negotiates a fixed set of cipher (called a ciphersuite) and a session key that will be
used for a TLS session. The ciphersuite is commonly based on RSA for authentication and
key exchange. However, from our study, ECC has some advantages over RSA for authenti-
cation. Therefore, the goal in this work is to study the replacement RSA algorithms that
consume high energy with ECC in the handshake protocol. We use both RSA and ECC in
the ciphersuite to make the standard TLS handshake protocol more energy efficient. This
work is extended from our work in [87].
1. TLS Standard Protocol
The TLS protocol or previously called Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol is widely used
to secure various network application protocols. It is the de facto standard for web-based
transactions for e-commerce (such as online banking and shopping). It is used to secure
application protocols such as email (IMAP, POP3, and ACAP) and network file systems
(NFS). Recently, it has been used as part of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
standard and IEEE 802.1X standard for authentication in WLANs [19, 15].
Figure V.1 shows the protocol primitives of the TLS Handshake protocol [43]. First,
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the Mobile Station (MS) client and the server exchange random numbers (or nonces) and
negotiate a “cipher suite” with ClientHello and ServerHello. The cipher suite specifies which
cryptographic algorithms can be used to provide confidentiality, authentication and data
integrity. The server then sends its certificate signed by a Certificate Authority (CA) which
is trusted by the MS and the server. The server also requests client authentication with
CertRequest message. The MS uses PKC Verify process to validate the server’s certificate
by using the CA’s public key (which is distributed beforehand). If it is valid, the MS obtains
the server’s public key from the server’s certificate.
ClientHello
ServerHello, ServerCert,
CertRequest, ServerHelloDone
Change Spec., Finished (Encrypted)
ClientCert, CertVerify, ClientKeyExchange,
ChangeSpec, Finished (Encrypted)
MS
Authentication
Server
PKC_Verify
PKC_Verify
PKC_KeyEx
PKC_KeyEx
PKC_Sign
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Figure V.1: The Handshake Protocol with Mutual Authentication
The MS then sends its certificate (ClientCert) signed by the CA to the server. The server
validates the MS’s certificate (using PKC Verify). This process is usually optional for web
browsers. The client also initiates a key exchange process (PKC KeyEx) to exchange a pre-
master secret. During this process, the MS sends an encrypted key in the ClientKeyExchange
message to the server so that the server can generate the same pre-master secret by decrypting
it using its private key. Additionally, the MS needs to authenticate itself to the server by
showing possession of its private key. The MS produces a message digest of previously
exchanged messages and signs the digest with its private key (using PKC Sign), and sends
the signed digest within the CertVerify message. Using the MS’s public key obtained from
the MS’s certificate, the server verifies the received digest (using PKC Verify). If it is valid,
the MS truly possesses the private key that pairs with the public key sent to the server.
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At this point, the MS and the server are authenticated to each other, and they already
share a master key derived from the key exchange process. To complete the Handshake
protocol, the MS and the server send the encrypted message digest of all previously exchanged
messages to ensure the integrity of the messages and to show possession of the shared master
key. Note that the three cryptographic processes, PKC Verify, PKC KeyEx, PKC Sign, are
different depending on which PKC algorithm (RSA or ECC) is used.
Fundamentally, at the MS, the Handshake protocol is composed of three processes: server
authentication, key exchange, and MS authentication. In the server authentication process,
a MS uses a digital signature verification (PKC Verify) process to validate a server’s cer-
tificate. This process uses either RSA or ECDSA verification algorithm but not both. The
key exchange (PKC KeyEx) process establishes a shared key which uses either RSA encryp-
tion/decryption or ECDH. The MS authentication (PKC Sign) process enables an MS to
prove its identity by digitally signing a message and sending it to a server. This process uses
either RSA or ECDSA digital signing algorithm.
2. The Variation of Handshake Protocol
From our experiments (described in Chapter III), we see that ECDSA has advantages over
the RSA signature algorithm in terms of energy consumption. However, signature verification
using ECDSA consumes more energy than the RSA signature verification algorithm. RSA
verification, like encryption is quite cheap in terms of energy consumption. In the key
exchange process, the RSA encryption algorithm consumes much less energy than the ECDH
algorithm to exchange a 48-byte pre-master secret. This asymmetrical nature of energy
consumption of the RSA and ECC algorithms is exploited in our proposed variation of the
Handshake protocol.
The goal of the proposed variation of the Handshake protocol is to reduce energy con-
sumption at only the MS side where the mobile device is energy constrained. The variation
introduces additional computational load at the fixed server-side device, but this would be
tolerable at the server. In this variation, the MS needs to hold an ECC-based certificate and
the server needs to hold an RSA-based certificate. The variation also requires more memory
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space to store both RSA and ECC modules than the traditional TLS protocol. However, it
would not be a constraint since the cost of memory is smaller than the cost of battery.
The variation is that, in Figure V.1, the MS uses the RSA verification algorithm to
validate the server’s RSA certificate in the PKC Verify process. Upon the certificate request
from the server, the MS sends its ECC certificate and not an RSA certificate. Then, in
the PKC KeyEx process, the MS generates and encrypts a pre-master secret using RSA
encryption algorithm along with the server’s public key (obtained from the server’s RSA
certificate). To prove its identity in the PKC Sign process, the MS signs all previously
exchanged messages using ECDSA. The security strength of the proposed protocol is the
same as that of the ECC and RSA algorithms if the proper key sizes are selected (160 bit
keys with ECC are equivalent to 1024 bit keys in RSA).
3. Results
Table V.2 shows the total average energy consumption on the client wireless device using
different Handshake protocols and different key sizes. These results are from the comparison
of RSA, ECC with the random binary curve (RBC), and the proposed variation of the
Handshake protocol. From the table, we see that by using the variation of the protocol, we
can save energy up to 90% compared to 4096-bit RSA or up to 70% compared to the 283-bit
ECC Handshake protocol. Note that the energy savings is small for smaller key sizes.
Table V.2: The Average Energy Consumption of a TLS Handshake Session
ECC Key Size Energy Consumption (mJ) Percent Saving Compared to
(RSA Key Size) RSA ECC RBC Proposed RSA ECC RBC
163 (1024) 5.07 13.02 3.82 24.79% 70.70%
233 (2048) 28.51 25.86 8.14 71.46% 68.54%
283 (4096) 186.05 50.13 18.27 90.18% 63.55%
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C. AN ENERGY EFFICIENT STANDARD SECURITY PROTOCOL FOR
WLANS
From our framework described in Chapter V.A, we offer a method of modification of protocol
primitives of a standard security protocol to be more energy efficient. In this section, we
propose a modification of a security protocol in WLANs for encryption and message authen-
tication services. The standard WLAN security protocol utilizes either RC4 or AES as an
underlying cipher. From our previous work in Section III.B.1, RC4 and AES have different
tradeoffs, and they may be used together to provide more energy saving. The goal of this
work is to use both AES and RC4 to provide more energy efficient encryption protocol. This
work is extended from our work in [86].
1. WLAN Standard Security Protocols
Currently, security protocols for WLANs, i.e., WEP, WPA, and WPA2 have been proposed
to provide security services such as encryption, authentication and data integrity. WEP has
been shown to be failed to provide such services. WPA and WPA2 have been proposed
to replace WEP. WPA utilizes RC4 cipher as a core cryptographic engine to provide the
services while WPA2 employs AES cipher. Both AES and RC4 have different pros and cons
as described in Section II.A.
From our study, we have shown that not only RC4 and AES have different pros and
cons, but also have different characteristics of energy consumption in data communication
networks such as WLANs. We know that for a small packet size, AES consumes less energy
than RC4. However, RC4 is more energy efficient for a large packet size. Based on this
simple fact, we propose an security protocol for WLANs based on the selection of AES or
RC4 as a cipher for packet encryption. The selection is based only on the size of the packet
to be encrypted. The result will yield more energy saving than than the standard protocols.
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2. The Proposed WLAN Security Protocol
We propose (see Figure V.2) an energy efficient security protocol for WLANs with a simple
modification. We use different cryptographic primitives to provide security to packets based
on their size and type. We show the results of how much energy can be saved by using such
a security protocol in WLANs.
Use RC4
Encryption
size > 80 
bytes
Use AES
Encryption End
No
Yes
Start
Management  
packet?
Use CBC-MAC 
function
Yes
No
Figure V.2: A Simple Energy Efficient Adaptive Security Protocol
We use CBC-MAC [28] to provide 128-bit message authentication to management pack-
ets such as an 802.11 ACKs (14 bytes long), beacon packets (40 - 546 bytes long), and other
short 802.11 management packets. The assumption here is that we need to provide only mes-
sage authentication to the control and management packets to prevent packet modification.
Additionally, the contents of these packets are not private; hence, encryption is unnecessary
unless complete privacy is required (and perhaps to thwart traffic analysis). For data pack-
ets, we use RC4 or AES to provide confidentiality. To be more energy efficient, we propose
to use RC4 only with the packets whose sizes are more than 80 bytes; otherwise AES is used.
The packet size of 80 bytes is determined based on our study in Section III.B.1 where we saw
that the AES performs better than RC4 with the packet size of 80 bytes or more. However,
there are security implications beyond the simple mechanisms used here. For instance, if
both RC4 and AES use the same key, if RC4 was broken and the key compromised, AES
would also be broken. In this study, we assume both AES and RC4 use two different keys.
From the results of the security performance in previous sections, we can compute the energy
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consumption of RC4, AES, and CBC-MAC as a function of packet sizes.
3. Experimental Design
In our study, we measure the energy consumption of cryptographic protocols in an emulated
environment. To create the emulated environment, we used a sniffer to capture packets
in two different network topologies, home and campus networks. Based on the collected
packets, we created an empirical distribution of the packet sizes in these networks. The
home network topology consisted of one access point and two mobile stations. The campus
topology consisted of 10 access points in an eight-story building and many mobile stations.
The packet size distributions for the two networks are shown in Figure V.3. The distributions
of the packets are used to compute the mean energy consumed by a mobile station in running
the security protocol. We can make the following observations from this figure. Most of the
packets in either network have small sizes. These are the management frames of IEEE 802.11
(probes, associations, reassociations, dissociations, and beacons) or acknowledgment frames.
As we will see below, this has an impact of how much energy is consumed in the security
process.
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Figure V.3: Distribution of packet sizes in home and campus networks
103
Most encryption algorithms operate in the following manner. Initially, there is a process
in which the key is manipulated in a certain way. In RC4, there is a key expansion process
and an initial permutation process that requires several swaps of bytes between vectors. In
AES, a key schedule has to be created [110]. In IEEE 802.11, each frame is self-synchronized.
That is, each frame needs to be received independently of other frames. Consequently, a
mobile station encrypts and decrypts each frame independently. The key manipulation
processes constitute an overhead for encryption and can form the significant part of energy
consumption while encrypting short packets. In [88] and in Chapter III, we showed that it
is better to use RC4 for long packets and AES for shorter packets for this reason.
4. Results
For the scenario where we captured packets (10 MB in total for the home network and 4
MB in total for the campus network), we calculate the energy consumed for each packet
based on its packet size and type. Table V.3 shows the results of energy consumption using
a fixed algorithm (AES or RC4) and the proposed algorithm. For the fixed algorithm, only
one selected encryption algorithm is used to encrypt all packets. We use a 128-bit keys for
both RC4 and AES functions. The key size is selected as the minimum requirement for
today’s security [69]. From the table, we see that by using the proposed algorithm we can
save about 0.01% and 57% of energy for the home network compared to using fixed RC4
and AES encryption algorithms, respectively. By using the proposed algorithm, we can also
save about 0.03% and 5% for the campus network compared to using fixed RC4 and AES,
respectively. The energy saving compared to using RC4 is not significant because most data
packet sizes are long. The energy saving comparing to RC4 use will be improved when the
average size of data packets is more than 80 bytes.
To provide stronger security by using AES and save energy, we could also fragment a
long packet into smaller packets and use AES to encrypt them. Additionally, smaller packets
are likely to be less susceptible to wireless channel errors, and hence, we could save much
more energy. Although the fragmentation would give significant energy efficiency, it will
also lower transmission throughput (thereby increasing the energy consumed) and increase
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Table V.3: A Comparison of energy consumption using the fixed and proposed security
protocols
Algorithm Energy Consumption (mJ) Percent Saving Compared to
RC4 AES Proposed RC4 AES
Home 99.7654 236.8924 99.7486 0.0168% 57.8928%
Campus 88.9532 93.8633 88.9279 0.0284% 5.2581%
latency. The tradeoffs in this approach needs a more detailed investigation.
D. LIMITATIONS OF THIS WORK
This work demonstrates the benefits of applying energy saving techniques in the design of
security protocols for wireless networks. A major limitation of this work is that we do not
tie it with the security requirements of the wireless network and the implications it may have
on the security provided to a wireless network. For a given network or application we need
a security policy - a statement of what is allowed and what is not allowed. The security
services that implement the security policy can then be defined (e.g., confidentiality for data
packets, only authentication for probes, ACKs and management packets). Then the way
these security services use security mechanisms and primitives adaptively to conserve energy
can be determined. Wherever possible, we have pointed out the pitfalls of blindly adopting
the approaches presented in the chapter. In the case of the variation of the handshake proto-
col for SSL, there needs to be a new protocol version that would support mixed RSA/ECC
algorithms. In the home WLAN example, we have ignored the way the communicating par-
ties would identify the encryption scheme that is used with a particular packet. We have
also ignored how different keys would be used with different encryption schemes, how they
are exchanged and so on. The assumption here is that all MSs share the same secret with
an AP and that secret is used for encryption and message authentication. Instead of using
the shared secret, there should be a key management that generates a pairwise key from
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the shared secret for each station, and it should be subject to be renewed after an interval.
Finally, we have not investigated in detail, the impact of the radio channel nor have we
designed protocols that can exploit knowledge of good and bad states of the channel to save
on the energy consumed.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter describes a framework for designing energy efficient security protocols. We use
our study in Chapter III to suggest three approaches for designing efficient security protocols.
We apply two of these approaches in simple examples to demonstrate the potential for saving
energy.
From the methodologies, one can modify the existing standard security protocols to be
energy efficient. It has been shown that the saving can be significant. The replacement of
some RSA with ECC algorithms in the TLS Handshake protocol can typically save about
25% to 70% compared to plain RSA and ECC, respectively. For the protocol modification in
WLANs, the saving ranges approximately 0.01% and 57% compared to using plain RC4 and
AES ciphers. However, these savings are limited due to the existing structure of the standard
security protocol design. The re-design can only improve the savings to some extent. For
example, we can only change the underlying ciphers or algorithms in order to make the
standard protocol more energy efficient. We cannot specify a security level for the protocol.
Due the limitations, we need a security system that is more flexible in which we can
finely tune our security needs to a just enough level and save even more energy. One can
say that the level of the energy saving depends on the level of protocol tuning. A more fine
protocol tuning can save more energy. In the next chapter, we propose a tunable security
system to support a fine-grained tuning mechanism for more energy saving.
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VI. TUNESEC: AN ENERGY EFFICIENT SECURITY PROTOCOL FOR
WLANS
From the proposed methodologies in Chapter V to save energy due to security services
for resource-limited mobile devices, we showed that Methods 1 and 2 can reduce energy
consumption while trying to comply with existing standards. In Methods 1 & 2, we utilized
different security algorithms in a standard protocol to reduce its energy consumption. In
Section V.B, we use both RSA and ECC public key algorithm to provide authentication
and key establishment service for the WTLS protocol while the standard one utilizes one or
the other. The use of RSA and ECC for different purposes during the protocol transaction
yields energy savings of approximately 20% to 70% for authentication and key establishment.
In Section V.C, we use AES and RC4 differently to provide encryption service based on
packet size while the standard WLAN utilizes either one. The result is that we can save
approximately from 0.01% to 57% of energy consumption of data encryption.
These two methodologies have shown that security algorithms can be combined differently
to reduce the energy consumption while providing a fixed security level to provide the same
security strength. These methods tend to be compatible with standard protocols which
support security services at a fixed level.
We however believe that additional energy savings can be achieved if we can provide
a fine-grained method for security provision to adjust not only the combination of the al-
gorithms, but also the security level needed for individual messages. Based on Method 3,
the greenfield approach, we propose an example security system to provide energy-efficient
security in which the security level of security services can be tunable. Our example security
system is called Tunable Security or TuneSec. This is NOT an optimally energy efficient se-
curity protocol, but it provides an example of how one can design a security protocol keeping
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energy consumption in mind.
TuneSec is divided into two parts to provide packet-level security and session-level se-
curity. The packet-level security service comprises of encryption and message authentica-
tion and the session-level security service comprises of authentication and key establishment
(AKE). Thus, we propose two different strategies to provide tunability to packet-level and
session-level security.
In this section, we will describe a high-level TuneSec architecture in Section VI.A. We
describe the TuneSec protocol for packet-level security in Section VI.B and for session-level
security in Section VI.C. Then, we apply the TuneSec framework to IEEE 802.11 WLANs
to provide energy efficient security services with the packet-level and session-level security,
and show performance results in Section VI.D. We conclude our work in Section VI.E.
A. TUNESEC ARCHITECTURE
The goal of the TuneSec is to be a tunable, simple, high performance and secure system that
offers energy efficient security services that depend on available resources and changes in
the dynamic environment in wireless networks. The scenario we consider is that of a mobile
terminal as a client connecting to an access point to access a network and to request and
utilize services in a secure and energy-efficient manner.
First, the access point initiates negotiation of a security association (SA) for a client based
on the available resources through a control channel. The control channel is also protected
using confidentiality and authentication techniques. The negotiated security association
should comply with the security policy established by the client or a system administrator.
The security association describes which security primitives are used and at what level.
Once the SA is establish, network applications can use the security services which can be
dynamically switched to fit the client’s available resource and security policy. Then, the data
from network applications are securely transmitted through a data channel.
The architecture of TuneSec system is shown in Figure VI.1. It is composed of five
components: (i) Security Policy and Association Manager (SPAM), (ii) Authentication and
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Key Manager (AKM), (iii) Resource Manager, (iv) Tuner, and (v) Security Service Manager
(SSM).
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Figure VI.1: The TuneSec Architecture
The main purpose of the Security Policy and Association Manager (SPAM) is to maintain
security policies and SAs, and to solve conflict between user and system policies. The policy
may be active in which it can be temporally changed according to available resources and
environments. Examples of the active policy scheme are Role-based Access Control (RBAC)
with an extension to active security [27] and Generalized Temporal RBAC (GTRBAC) [60].
In this work, we assume no security policy is active and does not pose any conflict.
The main purpose of the Authentication and Key Manager (AKM) is for authentication
and session key establishment. The AKMmay also be used to negotiate a security association
and to maintain the session key. It is also required to create and maintain a suite of SAs
corresponding to a security module for a given connection. In some case, control messages
are sent from the receiver to the sender through the AKM component to update or re-
negotiation the SA. An example of the AKM component is the IKE module of IPsec [39].
The AKM is involved only in the session-level security services. Before a session is started,
AKM gathers necessary information and establishes security modules needed for the session,
which are used by the Tuner to provide packet-level security services.
The resource manager reports the availability of resources to other components. Such
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resources are remaining battery level, the CPU load information, the transmission rate/
channel quality, possible location of the hosting device, and maybe alarms from the host or
the network system. The location of the device is possibly used for increasing or decreasing
the level of security when the device roams across different kinds of wireless networks. After
it gathers needed information, the resource manager summarizes and reports to Tuner for
making a decision.
The Tuner is responsible for making decisions about the security module used for each
application data set. In making the decision, the Tuner relies on the information about
system, network and application environments from other components such as the resource
manager, the SPAM, and the AKM. Based on the set of application data, the Tuner moves
the “switch” between different security modules to provide different security services. The
Tuner is only involved in the packet-level security services.
The main purpose of the security service manager (SSM) is to load and unload a secu-
rity module according to the SA suite provided by the AKM. The module is responsible to
perform packet-level security services such as encryption/decryption and message authenti-
cation code. It also reports any error or suspicious packet to AKM for further adjustment
or making a session.
In a system that supports the TuneSec system, the network application may need to
communicate with the Tuner for its specific security and resource policy for minimum security
level for its connection. The application may also provide information about how important
its data are and hence, security level may need to be adjusted according to the policy.
B. PACKET-LEVEL TUNESEC
The goal of packet-level TuneSec is to make the given security protocol be tunable to a
sufficient level of security at the packet level. To be able to determine the security level,
we need to identify “sufficient security” in a quantitative manner that can be converted to
parameters that are understandable to cipher algorithms. Upon having the parameters, we
need to apply them to an “adjustable security-level” cipher so that it can provide different
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security levels as needed, yet saving energy. In this section, we provide a mechanism to
interpret an abstract security level to some quantitative parameters, which are later applied
to existing ciphers such AES and RC5 to provide different security levels.
1. Flow Chart of TuneSec Mechanism
Figure VI.2 shows the flow chart of TuneSec mechanism. At the first step, a user may
initiate an information exchange session and asks for a specific security requirements. Then,
interpretation of these security requirements is needed to translate the requirements into
a set of quantitative parameters. Then, we use the parameters to create security modules
and to provide different levels of security. If there is a need to adjust the security services,
such as when the security need is changed or when the remaining energy budget is low, the
parameter interpretation is required again to create a new cipher module and to destroy the
unused one. The TuneSec is stopped when the user’s session is terminated.
Interpret
requirements to 
TuneSec
Parameters
Create
security
modules
Provide
security
services
Adjust
requirements
Adjust
the services?
Stop
Session
terminated?
Start
Figure VI.2: The TuneSec Mechanism Flow Chart
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2. Interpretation of Security Level
Generally, the term “security level” seems to be very abstract in which it can only be
qualitatively determined. Other previous works have proposed the way to qualitatively
indicate the security level. In [57], the security level is simply classified as low, medium,
and high. For each level, the security is numerically assigned based on fixed key size and
integrity rate for security. For example, low security means using 56-bit key and providing
message integrity to 60% of all packets. Similarly, in [112], the security level is known as a
class, each of which uses different algorithms and protocols. The qualitative classification of
the security level seems to be vague. For example, The 56-bit key encryption provides “low”
security level. The security class does not give a clear meaning of security level. Since the
low security can be interpreted in many ways with respect to individuals’ judgment.
In fact, we cannot provide security based on an abstract level, and we need a common,
understandable, and quantitative way to specify the security level. We can quantitatively
provide security based on the cost of data we want to protect. Since it is impossible to
provide “unbreakable” security, we often provide the security such that the cost of breaking
it is more than the benefit gained from breaking it or the value of the data being broken.
The value of data is naturally time-sensitive; for example, data we want to protect may
be worth a lot today, but may be worthless after 20 or 100 years. Thus, we propose to
provide the security level based on the time we need to protect any information or data.
Additionally, the security level is dependent on the packet type in wireless networks.
In IEEE 802.11 WLANs, there are 22 types of packets [13]. Each type definitely requires
a different security level. For example, we may only want to protect any Beacon packet
which contains network parameters such as SSID (Service Set Identifier), supported rates,
CF (contention free) period, and etc. for a few years, and to protect “Data” packets for
more years. Table VI.1 shows some examples of the number of years that may be required
for 802.11 WLAN packets for a low security level.
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Table VI.1: An Example of A Low Security Level for 802.11 Packets
Packet Years Description
Assoc Req 5 A request for association to an access point
Assoc Resp 5 A response to a client for association
Beacon 2 A packet to give network information
Authen 10 A request for authentication to an access point
Data 25 A payload carrying client’s data
3. Calculating TuneSec Parameters
In the previous section, we proposed to use the number of years as a security level to provide
security services to data. Then, we need to interpret the number of years to a security level.
We propose to employ not only the key size, but also the number of operational rounds as
the security level as described in Chapter IV.
Commonly, the security level is only defined in term of the key size. The longer the key
size, the higher the security level. However, this assumes that the number of operational
rounds is fixed at a level that the cryptanalysis attack is hard or completely impossible.
Using only the key size, we may not be able to provide a “true” different security level,
which in fact also relies on the number of operational rounds of a cipher. Therefore, we
propose to utilize both the key size and the number of operational rounds as parameters
for adjusting the security level. We have shown in Chapter IV that increasing the number
of rounds provides a higher cipher robustness; thus, yielding a higher security level against
cryptanalysis attacks. For easy understanding, we call both key size and the number of
operational rounds as TuneSec Parameters.
Figure VI.3 shows how we calculate the TuneSec Parameters. From the number of years
and data needed for protection, we calculate the needed key size using the security model
proposed by Lenstra and Verheul [69]. The needed key size (KS) is calculated using the
following formula:
KS = 56 + (y + y′ − 1982)× (12/m+ 1/b)
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where y is years needed for security, y′ is the current year (y′ = 2005). Here m is the
average number of months that the CPU speed and available memory is doubled. According
to Moore’s law, we define m = 18. The b is the number of years that the available budget
for attacking is doubled, and we define b = 10 as described in detail in [69]. This formula
is derived from incidents of breaking DES with a 56-bit key that it could happen, in theory,
in 1982 although it was first broken in 4 months in 1997 by Rocke Verser and in 56 hours
in 1998 by Electronic Frontier Foundation [49]. However, it is believed that DES could be
trusted to secure information only until 1982.
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Figure VI.3: The TuneSec Parameter Space
After having the needed key size for a cipher, it is easy to compute the MAC size.
The needed MAC size can be derived using the Birthday Paradox attack where only 2n/2
operations are needed to break the MAC, where n is the MAC size in bits. Note that
we require 2n operations for key searching attack, where n is the number of bits of the key.
Therefore, to provide an equivalent security level of MAC to the cipher, the MAC size should
be twice as long as the cipher key size.
To calculate the number of operational rounds, first we need to compute the security
robustness which is the multiplication of the number of operations and the amount of data
required for breaking. Based on the number of years, we can calculate how much computing
power is available in terms of MMYs. As derived in Lenstra and Verheul [69], the available
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MMY can be computed as:
AMMY = 0.5× 2(y′+y−1982)(12/m+1/b)
where AMMY is the available MMY that is possible to have in year y′ + y − 1982. The
calculation is based on the MMY margin (0.5 MMY in this case) which is possibly available
in year 1982, which can be used to break DES [69].
Then, we need to compute the possible amount of data available for cryptanalysis attack.
The amount of data depends on the available packet rate and the key lifetime. The key
lifetime says how long a session key will be used to provide security services. The key lifetime
can be specified using the session-level TuneSec. A long key lifetime makes a security system
more vulnerable.
Based on the key lifetime, which is the time a key will be used to provide security
services, we estimate the available data as the multiplication of the packet rate and the key
lifetime. Using the possible amount of data available and the MMY as the number of possible
operations, we calculate the robustness as their multiplication. From the robustness, we
derive the number of operational rounds using the robustness model that we have in Section
IV.B.3.
At this point, we have the needed key size and MAC size (derived from the key size) as
well as the number of operational rounds. These parameters, the TuneSec Parameters, will
later be used by a cipher to provide just needed security level.
4. Creating Security-Level Adjustable Modules
Once we have the TuneSec parameters, TuneSec creates one or more security modules to
provide security services. The security module is an adjustable cipher such as AES or RC5
or a MAC algorithm such as HMAC. There is no limitation on the number of security
modules created. For example, we can create different modules of AES, or one AES module
that can provide different security levels. Additionally, we may use both AES and RC5
modules. However, the number of cipher modules can be limited if devices have limited
memory resources, or it is defined by users or applications. However, we believe that the
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memory resources are not as limited as the available energy for small devices as the memory
capacity could be doubled approximately every 18 months according to advanced memory
chip technologies and Moore’s Law [58, 83].
We choose AES and RC5 as our adjustable ciphers because of two reasons. First, AES
and RC5 provide flexibility in changing the parameters such as key size, rounds, and block
size. Second, they are known to be efficient in term of computation and energy efficiency.
The current standard cipher such as AES does not provide the adjustable ability. However,
it is not hard to modify the AES to be adjustable and also to provide a security level as
needed. Like other block ciphers, AES employs several operational rounds to manipulate
input data into output data. As the input goes through more rounds, it is harder to trace
back from the output to input; hence, providing a strong encryption.
In the standard, AES uses 10, 12, and 14 rounds for keys of 128 bits, 192-bits, and 256
bits. The increased number of rounds provides strength against cryptanalysis attacks while
the increased key size provides strength against brute-force key attacks. As intended by the
Rijndael creators, AES can be very flexible. The key size can be increased from 128 bits to
a multiple of 64 bits such as 192 and 256 bits without increasing the number of rounds. In
contrast, we can increase the number of rounds without increasing the key size. To use AES
as an adjustable cipher, we only need to provide different key schedules for each round. The
key scheduling is a process that translates a user key (a fixed-size secret key) into a longer
key, and part of the long key is used for each round. Thus, for more rounds, we need a longer
key schedule.
RC5 is also designed to be flexible. It has a variable number of operational rounds from
0 to 255, key sizes from 0 to 2040 bits, and block size of 32, 64, or 128 bits. The suggested
parameter set is 12 rounds, 128-bit key, and 64-bit block size. However, 12-round RC5 was
discovered to be weak against an improved cryptanalysis attack in early 1998 [30]. Thus,
RC5 is suggested to be operated at 16 rounds to be completely secure [61]. However, we can
utilize the lower number of rounds as we need a lower security level.
We choose CBC-MAC to provide 128-bit MAC outputs and HMAC with SHA (HMAC-
SHA) to provide MAC outputs of 160, 256, 384, and 512 bits. The CBC-MAC algorithm
generates a MAC output using a block cipher. In our study, we choose to use 128-bit AES
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with the CBC-MAC which generates an 128-bit output. To generate longer outputs, we use
HMAC with SHA algorithm. HMAC can be used with any hash function such as MD5 or
SHA. The MD5 algorithm, known to be more efficient than SHA, but it is not as secure
as SHA [44]. A recent attack on MD5 claims to find a collision of MD5 outputs within an
hour [116] while such collision can happen in 15 days using the birthday paradox attack. A
real implementation of the shortcut attack shows that the collision can be found in 8 hours
using a 1.6 GHz Intel Pentium PC [64]. The SHA algorithm is also known to have weakness,
but the weakness is not as severe as that in MD5. A recent attack on SHA-1 provides a
shortcut attack that needs a number of operations less than that of the birthday paradox
attack. Compared to the number of operations needed for the birthday paradox attack, 280,
the shortcut attack requires only 269 operations [117]. Despite this attack, we choose SHA
because SHA is standardized by NIST, and it is widely used. However, a recent debate
suggests that the use of MD5 and SHA with HMAC is secure in spite of the weakness [65].
Second, SHA can produce variable output sizes of 160, 256, 384, and 512 bits.
C. SESSION-LEVEL TUNESEC
Session-level security services often serve two purposes, for authentication and for session
key agreement. The session-level security services are required before a packet-level service
can begin. Before a session is started, a user is needed to be authenticated before being
authorized to access network resources. This step is performed by the Authentication and
Key Manager as shown in the TuneSec architecture. Once a user is authenticated, the user
and a network server need to agree on a session key used to provide packet-level security
services for this session.
Due to the very specific characteristics of a wireless network, the Authentication & Key
Agreement (AKA) protocol is needed to be specifically designed to fit those characteristics.
For example, the AKA protocol for WLANs is totally different from that for GSM networks.
Due to their specific design, it is difficult to generalize the TuneSec concept for any AKA
protocol for all kinds of wireless networks. Therefore, in this study, we only propose a new
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AKA protocol based on TuneSec framework for only IEEE 802.11 WLANs to be tunable
and hence energy efficient.
1. The Problem with the IEEE 802.11 AKA Protocol
As we described in Section II.C.4, the IEEE 802.11 AKA protocol is composed of three
phrases, the Discovery and Association, the Authentication, and the 4-way Handshake pro-
tocol. At first, a mobile station (MS) discovers an access point (AP) that has capabilities to
support the MS’s security requirements. Then, the MS and the AP authenticate each other,
and the MS is granted an access to the network if the authentication is successful. Before
accessing the network, the MS and AP needs to agree on a master key, called Pairwise Master
Key (PMK), which may be used to re-associate to the network without the authentication.
From the PMK, the MS and the AP needs to agree on a temporary key or a session key,
called Pairwise Transient Key (PTK), using the 4-way handshake protocol. The PTK key is
subject to be used for a period of time until the MS disassociates from the network.
The problem with the IEEE 802.11 AKA protocol is that it does require the 4-way
handshake protocol when the MS wants to re-associate to generate a new PTK. Additionally,
the handshake protocol can be expensive for small limited-power devices. Therefore, we
propose to use one-time pad keys or one-time passwords for lightweight re-association to
replace the expensive 4-way handshake protocol. In our scheme, a series or a chain of one-
time passwords is recursively generated using a hash function to hash from one root key to
several child keys [68]. For WLANs, the root key is the PMK, and the child keys are the
PTKs.
The advantages of the proposed scheme are two-fold. First, from one PMK we generate
a series of PTKs using the hash chain. The length of the chain can be varied based on
the security level. A long PTK chain may be vulnerable to key collision; however, it can
save energy from performing a full association and the 4-way handshake. Second, by using
the hash chain, each PTK generated can be used as an authentication token, and MS does
not require a re-authentication process as long as the generated PTKs are not used up, yet
saving even more energy.
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The security level here is the inverse of the length of the PTK chain. A high security
level requires the chain length to be short to prevent from the key collision, which must
never happen in the one-time password scheme. In the following sections, we explain our
proposed scheme in more details and we show the performance comparison of the standard
AKA scheme to the proposed one.
2. One-time Secret Key Authentication Protocol
In this section, we propose a new authentication protocol that does not require the 4-way
handshake repeatedly, and it is able to provide a fresh key. It also provides a lightweight
(re)authentication to save energy for small wireless devices. The proposed protocol is based
on the concept of the one-time password scheme such as S/Key [53], and we call it One-time
Secret Key Authentication (OSKA) protocol.
After the first full AKA, the MS and AP possess a PMK. Then, the 4-way handshake
protocol is used to exchange nonces and to generate a root key, RK, from the PMK as shown
in equation VI.1 where the PRF (pseudorandom function) could be HMAC-SHA [66]. Then,
we use the RK to generate a sequence of one-time keys, Ki where i = n− 1 to 0 and n is the
length of the sequence, as shown in equation VI.2. The whole sequence needs not be stored
at the MS and AP if we cache the RK since we can always generate it from the cached RK.
RK = PRF (PMK,ANonce||SNonce||APMAC||MSMAC) (VI.1)
Ki−1 = f(Ki), i = n− 1 to 0 (VI.2)
For example, we generate Kn−1 = f(Kn) where Kn is the RK, and f(.) is a secure
hash function such as SHA [81]. Each Ki is used to generate PTKi for each re-association
as described later. The summary of the key derivation is shown in Figure VI.4. We may
provide up to 256 keys in a sequence if we define an 8-bit parameter for n. The length of
the sequence can be adjusted based on the tradeoff between energy and security which is
studied in the latter section. A shorter sequence yields better security, but more energy is
consumed because a full 4-way handshake protocol is required to generate a new RK for a
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new sequence. In contrast, a long sequence is probably susceptible to collisions (there may
be two similar keys in the sequence). However, using a secure hash such as SHA-512 which
produces an output of 512 bits, a long collision-free sequence can be obtained.
f( )
RK
Kn-1
K1
K0 PTK0
PTKn-1
PTK1
PRF( )
PRF( )
PRF( )
PRF( )
f( )
f( )
PMK
Figure VI.4: The Key Derivation for OSKA
a. The OSKA protocol After a full authentication and the key sequence derivation,
the MS and AP start using the first key, K0, to generate a pairwise transient key, PTK0, of
lengthm, using the HMAC-SHA algorithm [66]. The PTK is composed of keys for encryption
and for message authentication, and it is generated as shown in Figure VI.5.
For j? 0 to (m/128)
PTKi? PTKi || HMAC-SHA-1 (PMK, Ki ||
ANonce || SNonce || AP MAC || MS MAC || j)
PTKi? NULL
Figure VI.5: The PTK derivation
PTK0 is used until the MS disassociates from the AP, or there is a need for a key
change. The MS requests a new key by simply re-associating with the AP again, and in the
re-associate message, the MS attaches theK0, which is no longer used. The attachment ofK0
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serves two purposes. First, it is used for MS authentication. By verifying that K0 = f(K1),
AP knows that the MS is legitimate because only legitimate MS knows the key sequence.
The K0 needs not be encrypted since it is no longer a secret after once used. Additionally,
from the PTK derivation, an adversary who knows K0 cannot generate PTK0 without the
secret PMK; hence, it provides forward secrecy.
Second, it is used to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks by providing mutual authentica-
tion. As shown in Figure VI.6, for i = 0, after receiving K0, the AP authenticates the MS.
Then the AP replies whether it accepts the re-association. If not, the full authentication is
performed. Otherwise, the AP generates a MIC using HMAC-SHA(K1,K0), and replies to
MS for AP authentication. The MS verifies the MIC using K1. After authentication, both
MS and AP discard K0, update the currently used key to be K1, and derive PTK1. As the
re-association number grows, the one-time key in the sequence may be used up. Then, a full
authentication is required.
MIC = HMAC-SHA-1(Ki+1, Ki)
Association Response, 
Re-Association ok?
Association Request, Ki
MS AP
Derive
PTKi
Derive
PTKi
(1)
(2)
(3)
Figure VI.6: The OSKA Protocol
b. OSKA Security analysis We analyze OSKA security protocol based on security
reasoning and argument. Despite a formal verification, the reasoning and argument are a
practical and common method of analyzing a security protocol based on past incidents of
discovered flaws in security protocol design [24, 17].
Key Recovery:
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The security of the OSKA depends on the strength of the hash function, f(.), such as SHA
which is standardized by NIST. SHA is known to be (so far) a strong hash function while
MD5, another popular hash function, is known to have collisions for some inputs [116]. From
the properties of the SHA, it is computationally impossible to reverse the key sequence. For
example, an adversary cannot derive Kj though he knows Kj−1, Kj−2, . . . , K0.
Key Reusing or Key Replay Attack:
An adversary can replay the key if a key sequence is not freshly generated. In the OSKA
protocol, we generate a key sequence based on new nonces from MS (SNonce) and AP
(ANonce), and this guarantees the freshness.
Man-in-the-Middle attack:
The attack can be prevented by mutual authentication. To authenticate a MS, an AP needs
to prove that Ki = f(Ki+1) where Ki is attached in the (Re)Association message. To
authenticate the AP, the MS needs to verify that the MIC in Message (3) in Figure VI.6 is
valid.
Birthday paradox attack:
A hash function is often subject to a birthday paradox attack [75]. To use a hash function to
generate a key which provides a resistance of the birthday paradox attack, the hash output
should be twice as long as the key length. For example, to generate a 128-bit Ki, we use
SHA-256 which produces a 256-bit output. Then, we can truncate it to use only 128 bits.
We use SHA-384 and SHA-512 to generate a 192-bit and 256-bit key, respectively. The use
of SHA algorithm is strictly deployed as specified in the FIPS 180-1 standard [81].
3. OSKA Performance Results
In this section, we show the performance of OSKA compared to the standard protocol. We
use the cycle counting method as described in Section III.A to measure energy consumption
used by any cryptographic process. We calculate the transmission/reception energy based
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on the amount of data exchanged during a protocol transaction. By using the linear energy
model for WaveLAN wireless interface [45], we can approximate the energy consumption
of transmission and reception. It requires (431 µJ + 0.48 µJ/bytes) for point-to-point
transmission of messages, and (316 µJ + 0.12 µJ/bytes) for receiving messages.
Figure VI.7 shows the total energy used for AKA protocols as the number of re-associations
increases. The total energy includes energy from both transmission and cryptographic pro-
cesses. Despite the existing standard re-association protocol, most commercial wireless de-
vices do not support the re-association since it is not mandatory in the standard. The full
association needs to start over from the association and discovery phase to the 4-way hand-
shake phase, which consumes a great amount of energy. Using the standard re-association,
the energy consumption is reduced. Compared to them, our proposed protocol, OSKA with
a 256-bit key, performs much better in terms of total energy consumption since it reduces
the energy from message handshaking.
Figure VI.8 shows the energy consumption from only the cryptographic process. It is
shown that the OSKA outperforms the standard re-association when the number of re-
associations exceeds about 30 re-associations. We do not show the performance of the full
association since its energy consumption linearly grows at a much higher rate.
Figure VI.9 shows the energy consumption of 1000 re-associations as the length of the
key chain increases. The increase of key chain means that we require less full associations
to generate PMKs. For example, the key chain of 20 keys requires 50 out of 1000 full
associations to generate 50 PMK keys, each of which is used to generate 20 PTKs.
For a small chain length, OSKA consumes high energy; however, as we increase the
key chain length, the energy consumption is exponentially reduced. This is because we
infrequently need a full associations, an expensive operation, to generate a new key chain
as we set the key chain length to be long. The energy consumption of using standard re-
associations is also reduced as the frequency of full associations decreases. However, its
energy consumption is much higher compared to OSKA.
To reduce its energy consumption, OSKA uses a long key chain to avoid an expensive
full association process. However, the long key chain may be subject to a collision in which
two PTK keys are generated from one PMK key. Figure VI.10 shows the probability of
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key collision of OSKA key chain. As the length of the key chain increases, the collision
probability is slightly increased. It shows that using a 512-bit hash function to generate the
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OSKA key chain highly reduces the probability of collision.
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D. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
1. Pre-Defined Security Levels
In Chapter III, we have shown that the energy consumption of security services such as
encryption and message authentication is different due to security properties such as key
size, operational rounds, and ciphers as well as the data packet size. A set of properties can
provide different security level and consume different energy level. To provide energy efficient
security services, we need to determine a sufficient security level to provide security services
to yield more energy savings. The goal of packet-level TuneSec here is to find a sufficient
security level based on network packet types and to provide security services according to
the security level.
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In this section, we only consider IEEE 802.11 WLANs. In this study, we define 5 security
schemes, each of which differently defines a security level for each packet type defined in
IEEE 802.11 standard. Table VI.2 shows these five security schemes and levels in term of
the number of years the data should be protected for each scheme for each packet type. In
this table, we define three levels: low, medium and high, that provides different security
levels for different packet types. These three schemes are supported by TuneSec system,
in which a security level can be fine-tuned for each packet type. We also define two fixed-
security schemes, fixed-low and fixed-high, in which all packet types have the same security
level. From the years needed for data protection in the table, we interpret the number of
years into the TuneSec parameters (rounds, key size, and MAC size) for ciphers and MAC
functions to provide just enough security level.
Table VI.2: Years to protect data based on IEEE 802.11 packet types
Years Protected
Type Packet Services High Medium Low Fixed Low Fixed High
Management Assoc Req (1) 20 10 5 25 100
Assoc Resp (1) 20 10 5 25 100
ReAssoc Req (1) 20 10 5 25 100
ReAssoc Resp (1) 20 10 5 25 100
Probe Req (1) 5 3 2 25 100
Probe Resp (1) 5 3 2 25 100
Beacon (1) 5 3 2 25 100
ATIM (1) 5 3 2 25 100
DisAssoc (1) 5 3 2 25 100
Authen (1) 40 20 10 25 100
DeAuthen (1) 5 3 2 25 100
Control Action (1) 5 3 2 25 100
PS-poll (1) 5 3 2 25 100
RTS (1) 5 3 2 25 100
CTS (1) 5 3 2 25 100
Ack (1) 5 3 2 25 100
CF-End (1) 5 3 2 25 100
CF-End+Ack (1) 5 3 2 25 100
Data Data (1,2) 100 50 25 25 100
Data+CF-Ack (1,2) 100 50 25 25 100
Data+CF-Poll (1,2) 100 50 25 25 100
Data+CF-Ack/Poll (1,2) 100 50 25 25 100
Null (1) 20 10 5 25 100
Null+CF-Ack (1) 20 10 5 25 100
Null+CF-Poll (1) 20 10 5 25 100
Null+CF-Ack/Poll (1) 20 10 5 25 100
(1) = Message Authentication services, (2) = Encryption service
We also provide different security services to different packet types. In the table, Ser-
vice (1) means Message Authentication service, and Service (2) means Confidentiality or
Encryption. For example, we may provide both encryption and message authentication
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Table VI.3: The security level of session-level security protocols
Security Level Low High Fixed Low Fixed High
# of Full Asso-
ciations
Using OSKA
for every 50
associations
Using OSKA
for every 5
associations
Using standard
re-association
for every 50
associations
Using standard
re-association
for every 5
associations
to Data packets which may contain sensitive data. However, we may provide only mes-
sage authentication to those Management and Control packets such as Beacon, Associa-
tion/Disassociation, etc. since they contain no secret. However, it depends on the users or
application requirements to define such services. We only provide here an example for what
we can expect in a typical WLAN.
Table VI.3 defines four security levels for session-level security for associations in IEEE
802.11 WLANs. For fixed security levels, we use the standard re-association as defined
in the 802.11 standard [13]. For TuneSec, we use OSKA as the security protocol for re-
associations. For the low security level, we infrequently perform the full authentication to
refresh the master key, PMK. For a higher security level, the interval of the master key
refreshment needs to be shorter to reduce the probability of a successful security attack.
2. Performance Study
In this performance study, our goal is to find how much energy can be saved in typical WLAN
environments. We collect packet traces using an 802.11 sniffer. Each packet trace contains
packets that have been sent and received by a client or a mobile station. It also includes
packets that are broadcast to clients for network management purpose. Such packets are
Beacon and CTS/RTS packets for collision avoidance, etc. The traces include all kinds of
packets, Management, Control and Data packets according to the 802.11 standard [13].
We collect the traces from 3 different network locations to provide diversity in our test
environments. We collect traces in a home network, at Hillman library, and in the School of
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Information Science (SIS) building, which have three different characteristics. In the home
network, there is only one access point (AP) and few mobile devices. At the library, there
are several APs and more client devices, and its physical environment is a big hall room in
which received signal strength (RSS) at client devices is probably high, and a typical packet
loss rate is low. At the SIS building, its physical environment is a multi-floor office building
which also has several APs and client devices. We have collected 12 traces for each location
and the summary of traces is shown in Table VI.4. Figure VI.11 shows the Cumulative
Distribution Functions (CDF) of the packet size of the traces at three locations. It can be
seen that all three locations have similar packet size distributions in which there are more
short packets than long packets.
Table VI.4: A Summary of Packet Traces
Location Traces Total Packets Total Bytes Association
Requests
Home 12 286,307 65,669,596 57
Library 12 2,831,383 292,323,060 53
Building 12 1,248,565 375,997,034 41
In addition to five different security schemes, we also use three different cipher schemes
for providing security services. The three scheme are using only AES cipher (ALLAES),
only RC5 cipher (ALLRC5), and using both AES and RC5 (BOTH). The last scheme is the
feature of TuneSec in which we can add more than one security module such as AES and
RC5 cipher modules. We use AES and RC5 because from our study, it is shown that for
packet sizes of less than 80 bytes, AES consumes less energy than RC5. Therefore, we use
AES for packets whose size is less than 80 bytes; otherwise, we use RC5.
For providing message authentication service, we use one MAC algorithm, HMAC-SHA,
for the scheme that uses only one cipher, ALLAES and ALLRC5. However, when using
BOTH scheme, we use both CBC-MAC and HMAC-SHA. We utilize CBC-MAC to provide
128-bit MAC output, and HMAC-SHA to provide 160, 256, 384, and 512 bits of MAC
outputs.
128
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Packet Size (bytes)
F(
x)
At Home: Packet Size CDF
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Packet Size (bytes)
F(
x)
At Hillman Library: Packet Size CDF
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Packet Size (bytes)
F(
x)
At SIS Building: Packet Size CDF
Figure VI.11: The CDF of Packet Size in Different Locations
3. Packet-Level Security Performance Results
In this section, we show the performance results of using TuneSec with five security schemes,
three cipher schemes, and at three locations. Figure VI.12 shows the average energy con-
sumption of using fixed and fine-tuning security levels with different cipher schemes for the
Hillman library network. The bar height shows the average of normalized energy consump-
tion (in µJoule/byte), and the lines on the bars show the 95% confidential interval.
From the figure, it is shown that using TuneSec can save energy in both the low and high
security scenarios compared to the fixed low and high scenarios. The amount of savings using
TuneSec in the high security scenario is more than that in the low security scenario. This is
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Figure VI.12: Comparison of Different Security Levels for the Hillman Library Network
the case that in the high security scenario, the amount of computation for security is intensive
due to the high security requirement, and using TuneSec can leverage the computation and
hence save energy.
When comparing between the cipher schemes, ALLAES scheme consumes more energy
than ALLRC5 scheme. This shows that in the network, the size of data packets is more than
80 bytes on the average. Note than both schemes use the same MAC function, HMAC-SHA,
for authentication of management and control packets whose size is typically smaller than
that of data packets. However, BOTH scheme, which utilizes both AES and RC5 ciphers as
well as both CBC-MAC and HMAC-SHA, can save more energy although it is not significant
in this case.
Figures VI.13 and VI.14 show the average energy consumption of using fixed and fine-
tuning security levels for the SIS building network and the Home network, respectively. When
comparing three different networks or locations, the energy consumption at the Hillman
library location as shown in Figure VI.12 is higher than that in the SIS building and in the
Home network because there are more users in the same network at the Library. We show
all performance results as the mean and standard deviation in Table VI.5.
Table VI.6 shows the amount of energy consumption (in µJ/byte) which is compared
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Figure VI.13: Comparison of Different Security Levels for the SIS Building Network
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Figure VI.14: Comparison of Different Security Levels for the Home Network
between using fixed security levels and using TuneSec and the percentage of energy saving
of different settings. It is shown that we can save up to 8% for low-level security, and up to
43 % for high-level security.
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Table VI.5: A Comparison of Energy Consumption
SIS Building At Home At Library
Scheme Level Avg. Energy STDEV Avg. Energy STDEV Avg. Energy STDEV
(µJ/byte) (µJ/byte) (µJ/byte)
ALLAES Low 0.00963087 0.00489169 0.01309751 0.00276620 0.01801368 0.00305351
Medium 0.00963633 0.00488853 0.01310135 0.00275733 0.01815302 0.00306116
High 0.01155064 0.00568788 0.01551342 0.00341330 0.02106827 0.00356431
FixedLow 0.01028754 0.00485831 0.01353913 0.00259690 0.01961033 0.00381954
FixedHigh 0.01663180 0.00742264 0.01679438 0.00175423 0.03667975 0.01400912
ALLRC5 Low 0.00812484 0.00329794 0.00872728 0.00156698 0.01444745 0.00422319
Medium 0.00838126 0.00302813 0.01045390 0.00201349 0.01649165 0.00441110
High 0.01070796 0.00379244 0.01239773 0.00254900 0.01928582 0.00545369
FixedLow 0.00878151 0.00339058 0.00916890 0.00143555 0.01604409 0.00497666
FixedHigh 0.01749185 0.00740832 0.01716274 0.00192737 0.03770560 0.01460972
BOTH Low 0.01833452 0.00773463 0.02027844 0.00225421 0.03948805 0.01302484
Medium 0.00775267 0.00333283 0.00858821 0.00151851 0.01407481 0.00397385
High 0.00776370 0.00312620 0.01019322 0.00192935 0.01576759 0.00390110
FixedLow 0.00984792 0.00395622 0.01202937 0.00242636 0.01825997 0.00469288
FixedHigh 0.00840934 0.00342177 0.00902983 0.00138323 0.01567145 0.00473783
Table VI.6: The Percent Saving of Fixed Security and TuneSec
Energy Consumption (µJ/byte)
Scheme Fixed TuneSec % Saving
Low High Low High Low High
ALLAES 0.01447900 0.02603367 0.01358069 0.01604411 6.204 38.372
ALLRC5 0.01133150 0.02412007 0.01043319 0.01413050 7.928 41.416
BOTH 0.01103688 0.02336864 0.01013856 0.01337908 8.139 42.748
4. Session-level Security Performance Results
In this section, we show the performance results of session-level security (it occurs during
the association or re-association phase). We use the traces from three different locations and
determine the possible number of associations in the typical WLAN environment. Then,
we calculate the amount of energy consumption for each association, which can be a full
association, a standard re-association, and the proposed OSKA re-association as shown in
Table VI.3. The calculation of energy consumption is similar to that described in Section
VI.C.3.
Table VI.7 shows the amount of energy consumption in millijoules in the three typical
WLAN environments for two different security levels as described in Section VI.D.1. We
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Table VI.7: Session-level Security: Energy Consumption (mJ)
Scheme Level SIS Building At Home At Library
Full Low 159.9070 222.3097 206.7090
Associations High 159.9070 222.3097 206.7090
Standard Low 103.9164 145.3226 135.321036
ReAssociation High 113.7147 157.9205 146.519156
OSKA-256 Low 49.2392 70.14151 65.6076139
High 68.6060 95.04177 87.7411726
can see that the energy consumption of session-level security in the Home environment is
higher than that in other environments because there are more associations and possible
re-associations as shown in Table VI.4.
It is shown in Table VI.8 that by using OSKA with 256-bit key chain, we can reduce
the energy consumed by a significant amount. The reduction is up to 68% for low security
level and up to 57% for high security level. The saving is less for the high security level due
to the fact that we require a higher number of full associations (which includes expensive
authentication) to reduce the probability of a successful attack. Otherwise, we can reduce
the energy used for the session-level security as we reduce the number of full associations as
well as reduce the security level.
Table VI.8: The percentage of average energy saving using OSKA
Scheme Energy Consumption (mJ) % Energy Saving in TuneSec
Low High Low High
Full Assoc 196.3085 196.3085 68.58% 57.31%
Standard Reassoc 128.1866 139.3848 51.89% 39.88%
OSKA-256 61.6627 83.7963 - -
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5. TuneSec Performance Summary
In this section, we look at the overall performance of TuneSec security protocols (including
session-level and packet-level security protocols) compared to the fixed-level security protocol
that is suggested by IEEE 802.11 or WPAv2 standards. We use the traces described in
Section VI.4 and combine the average energy consumption at the packet-level and session-
level security as already described in Sections VI.D.3 and VI.D.4, respectively. In Table
VI.9, we see that by using TuneSec security protocols, we can save energy up to 10% for
low-level security and up to 42% for high-level security compared to the standard WLAN
security protocol.
Table VI.9: The Average of the Total Energy Consumption (mJ) of Packet Traces
Scheme Security Level
Low High
Fixed 2825.6109 5831.6779
TuneSec 2539.3036 3332.0114
% Saving 10.13% 42.86%
E. CONCLUSION
We have proposed the concepts of tunable security that the level of security services should
be adjustable to support security requirements, yet providing a sufficient security level. We
explain the TuneSec architecture that is designed to support tunable security features. We
have divided the TuneSec security into packet-level and session-level services. The packet-
level security services are at the packet level to provide encryption or confidentiality and
message authentication. In contrast, the session-level security services provides authentica-
tion and key agreement for a session to be started. The agreed key will be used for the
packet-level security.
We have proposed to use the number of years as a quantitative indicator for an abstract
security level. From the number of years, we proposed an interpretation of security robustness
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which is later used to determine the number of operational rounds used by a security module.
A high security level requires a security module to operate with a high number of rounds.
We used RC5 and AES ciphers as the security modules due to their flexibility, well-known
secure design, and their wide usage.
In our previous study in Section V.C, we could save up to 57% by using RC4, AES
and CBC-MAC to provide security services at the fixed level of 128-bit key or 70 years of
security. By using the packet-level TuneSec which provides a fine-grained security tuning to
the packet level, it has been shown that the amount of energy saving can be further reduced
by about 6% to 40% compared to using a fixed level security protocol as in our previous
study.
The deployment of TuneSec in session-level services is difficult due to the necessity of it
being specific to the design of the session-level protocol. Thus, we propose to use the TuneSec
concepts to the session-level services only in WLANs. We have proposed One-time Secret
Key Authentication (OSKA) as an adjustable authentication and key agreement protocol.
OSKA provides a key chain which can be used not only for the packet-level security, but
also as an authentication token for a lightweight re-authentication process. Hence, we reduce
the number of full re-authentication process which is expensive, and increase the amount of
energy saving. OSKA is secure and also energy efficient.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Information security services for today’s computing is no longer a choice. It must be deployed
to prevent information abuse and to protect malicious attacks. Basic information security
services are confidentiality or encryption, authentication, and integrity. To provide the
services, we need to leverage our computing resources. Small wireless devices often have
very limited resources especially battery power. A high and intensive security service is not
always the best for wireless devices. We need a way to provide security services that are
suitable for the small and wireless devices.
In this work, we proposed the concept of providing just enough security in which the
security level is determined and security services are provided with the minimum use of
energy resources. We used the concept of tunability of security strength to account for
different security needs instead of a fixed level as provided in today’s security services.
The tunable security or TuneSec provides a fine-grained security level specification. For
example, a fixed security service may prevent an unauthorized access to all of the informa-
tion for 100 years. However, some part of the information may not require the 100-year
protection. By using the TuneSec mechanism, security levels can be specified to each part
of the information that requires different security strength. Hence, energy is saved by using
appropriate ciphers for appropriate packet sizes and content.
A. SUMMARY
In our work, we have proposed an energy efficient security framework. We suggest three
methodologies for energy efficient security protocol design. The first method suggests the
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replacement of the security algorithm with one that consumes less energy. From our study, we
have found this is possible due to the variety of cryptographic algorithms and their differences
in performance. We applied this method to the TLS Handshake protocol to use both RSA
and ECC public key algorithms to achieve a more energy efficient TLS Handshake protocol
that is still able to provide the equivalent level of security strength and still be compatible
to the TLS standard. Using this method with the handshake protocol, we can save about
25% to 70% energy compared to the plain handshake protocol.
The second method in our proposed framework suggests the modification to standard
protocols in order to achieve energy efficiency. We apply this method to a standard WLAN
security protocol. We modify the protocol such that two ciphers are used to provide packet
encryption based on the packet size. From our study, we have shown that AES cipher
performs better than RC4 cipher when the packet size is about 80 bytes or smaller. We have
also utilized the MAC to provide message authentication based on the packet type. In our
study, we have achieved approximately up to 57% energy reduction. Using this method, the
security level provided to each packet is still fixed.
In the last method, we suggest the greenfield approach, where a new system is designed to
provide an energy efficient security protocol. In this work, we developed an example TuneSec
system where the security level can be adjusted to provide different levels to different packets.
We have shown that the use of TuneSec can save even more energy, from approximately 6%
up to 40%, on the top of the fixed security level system. The percentage of energy saving may
vary depending on the security specification. TuneSec is designed based on a very simple, yet
practical concept. It can be applied to any security scheme related to any small and limited-
resource devices. Especially in wireless networks where a cell phone is built to be smaller
and smarter and security services are of paramount importance, the TuneSec framework can
be deployed to provide security services, and yet be secure at the very minimum amount of
energy consumption.
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B. FUTURE RESEARCH
The TuneSec framework is a proof-of-concept that security can be provided at different
levels and hence consumes different level of energy. It is not optimal, nor does it use specific
benchmarks of available resources to pick cipher suites and so on. One approach to achieve
an optimal method of saving energy is to use approaches like [100]. TuneSec also ignores
communication protocols. Combining energy efficient communication protocols with security
protocols could potentially save more energy.
Future work can also build a prototype utilizing the TuneSec framework and apply it to
be used with multimedia applications on small and limited devices over a wireless network.
Potential applications are Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) over Wireless LAN network,
or video-on-demand over WLANs. We expect a tremendous saving on such applications due
to their intensive use of the resources.
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APPENDIX
ABSOLUTE ACCURACY CALCULATION
The absolute accuracy shows the specification of a measurement of data to show the actual
range of the measurement error in a given environment. There are five variables for absolute
accuracy calculation:
• Percent of Reading – is uncertainty gain that is multiplied by the actual input voltage
for the measurement.
• Offset – is a constant value applied to all measurements.
• System Noise – is a natural random noise that may occur in the system.
• Temperature Drift – is the drift due to the ambient temperature of measurement. If the
temperature is between 15 to 35◦C, the temperature drift is already compensated by the
system. Otherwise, the calculation of additional temperature drift is required.
• Input Voltage – the value of input voltage being measured.
Below is the formula of absolute accuracy and its relative to input (RTI) percentage.
Absolute Accuracy = ±[(Input Voltage×% of Reading) + (.1)
Offset + System Noise + Temperature Drift] (.2)
Absolute Accuracy RTI = ±Absolute Accuracy
Input Voltage
(.3)
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In our measurement, we use a data acquisition (DAQ) system which includes an SCXI-
1100 module of National Institute to measure the voltage dropped across an 1 ohm resistor
which is calculated as an input current used by our laptop or a device-under-test. Our ambi-
ent temperature is between 15 to 35◦C; hence, there will be no drift. From the specification
of SCXI-1100 when using at ±10V range, we have the percent of reading of 0.05%, the offset
of 250µV and the noise of 15µV .
From our experiment, we found a range of the voltage between 2.001194 and 2.328655
volts. Therefore, we calculate the absolute accuracy for the minimum and the maximum
voltages as follows. The minimum absolute accuracy and its RTI are
Min. Absolute Accuracy = ±[(2.001194× 0.05%) + 250 µV + 15 µV + 0] (.4)
= ±1.265 mV. (.5)
Min. Absolute Accuracy RTI = ± 1.265 mV
2.001194 V
(.6)
= ±0.0632%. (.7)
(.8)
The maximum absolute accuracy and its RTI are
Max. Absolute Accuracy = ±[(2.328655× 0.05%) + 250 µV + 15 µV + 0] (.9)
= ±1.429 mV. (.10)
Max. Absolute Accuracy RTI = ± 1.265 mV
2.001194 V
(.11)
= ±0.0614%. (.12)
(.13)
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